The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2\u27s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study by Bernstein, Lisa
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
1999
The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's
Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study
Lisa Bernstein
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lisa Bernstein, "The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study," 66 University of
Chicago Law Review 710 (1999).
The Questionable Empirical Basis of
Article 2's Incorporation Strategy:
A Preliminary Study
Lisa Bernsteint
The Uniform Commercial Code,' the Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods,2 and the modem Lex
t Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I would like to thank my research assis-
tants Marc Blitz (silk), Richard Welch (hay), Drew Porter (coffee), Andrea Adelman and
Deborah Healy (grain and feed), Mary LaBrec (textiles), as well as Connie Fleischer, Bill
Schwesig, Chuck Ten-Brink, David Barrett, Carmen Abber, and Lorrie Ragland. I would
also like to thank Onri Ben-Shahar, Yoram Barzel, Lucian Bebchuk, Edward Bernstein,
Brian Bix, David Charny, Dick Craswell, Richard Epstein, Clay Gillette, Victor Goldberg,
Jack Goldsmith, Philip Hamburger, Alon Harel, Claire Hill, Ehud Kamar, Alan Kamp,
Louis. Kaplow, Avery Katz, Dan Klerman, Doug Lichtman, Ronald Mann, Ed Morrison,
Dennis Patterson, Eric Posner, Richard Ross, Keith Sharfman, Steve Shavell, Alex Stein,
Cass Sunstein, Bill Vulkovitch, Jim Whitman, Eyal Zamir, and participants at the North-
western University Law School Symposium on Relational Contracting, Harvard Law and
Economics Workshop, University of Montreal Law School Workshop, Columbia Law
School Law and Economics Workshop, Berkeley Law and Economics Workshop, Univer-
sity of Virginia Faculty Workshop, American Law and Economics Association Annual
Meeting (Contract Law Panel), Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, and The
University of Chicago Law Review Symposium Formalism Revisited for helpful comments
or discussions. This research is part of a larger project on private commercial law that is
sponsored by NSF Grant SBR-9422795. Additional funding was provided by the Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School.
This Article focuses solely on UCC Article 2 as supplemented by the relevant parts
of Article 1. UCC §§ 1-2 (West 14th ed 1995). The incorporation principle is expressed in
the Code sections dealing with course of dealing and usage of trade, id at § 1-205, and
course of performance, id at § 2-208, as well as in the Code's definition of "Agreement,"
which includes "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implica-
tion from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance." Id at § 1-201(3). It is also at the heart of the Code's duty of good faith, which
requires that merchants act in accordance with "the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade," id at § 2-103(b), which is to be "further imple-
mented by Section 1-205 on course of dealing and usage of trade," id at § 1-203 cmt, as
well as the Code's interpretive approach, which directs courts to determine "the meaning
of the agreement of the parties ... by the language used by them and by their actions,
read and interpreted in light of commercial practices and other surrounding circum-
stances. The measure and background for interpretation are set by the commercial con-
text, which may explain and supplement even the language of formal or final writing" Id
at § 1-205 cmt 1. See also id at § 2-301 cmt ("In order to determine what is 'in accordance
with the contract' under this Article usage of trade, course of dealing and performance,
and the general background of circumstances must be given due consideration.). The in-
corporation principle is also embodied in numerous Code provisions and Official Com-
ments that direct courts to take into account "usages of trade," "commercial standards,"
"the law merchant," and other aspects of the contracting context in filling gaps. See gener-
ally the obligations in UCC Art 2, Part 3 ("General Obligation and Construction of Con-
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Mercatoria3 are based on the premise that unwritten customs and
usages of trade exist and that in commercial disputes they can,
and should, be discovered and applied by courts.4 The existence of
commercial customs that can be discovered and codified by dili-
gent observers is also at the heart of some proposals for creating
commercial law in developing or formerly socialist countries.'
tract"), and its associated Official Comments. Less noticeably, and typically ignored by
commentators, the incorporation strategy, in the form of explicit references to usages of
trade, commercial standards, and commercial context, as well as references to what is
commercially reasonable, seasonable, and commercially impracticable, also runs through
numerous Code provisions (as explicated by their associated Official Comments) that
might broadly be termed "traffic rules" and that unlike gap fillers are, as a practical mat-
ter, difficult, if not impossible, to negate. See generally UCC Art 2, Part 2 ("Form, Forma-
tion and Readjustment"); Part 5 ("Performance"); Part 6 ("Breach, Repudiation and Ex-
cuse"); Part 7 ("Remedies"). Finally, most generally, one of the stated "[u]nderlying pur-
poses" of the Code is "to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties." UCC § 1-102.
' See, for example, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods ("CISG") Art 9(2) (1980), reprinted in United Nations, Conference on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, 19 ILM 671, 674 (1980) ("The parties are considered,
unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its forma-
tion a usage of which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in international
trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type in-
volved in the particular trade concerned").
The term lex mercatoria is generally understood to include international conven-
tions on the sale of goods and written compilations of custom like the Incoterms (see note
139), as well as unwritten customs and practices that are either specific to a particular
trade or are applicable to all commercial transactions. See, for example, Harold J. Berman
and Felix J. Dasser, The 'New" Law Merchant and the 'Old:" Sources, Content, and Le-
gitimacy, in Thomas E. Carbonneau, ed, Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion of
the New Law Merchant 21-36 (Transnational Juris 1990) (discussing the customary basis
of the lex mercatoria); Keith Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, in Carbonneau,
ed, Lex Mercatoria 99, 104-05 (same).
This Article's discussion of the UCC focuses nearly exclusively on disputes between
merchants. Early drafts of the Code provided for the use of either arbitrators or merchant
juries to determine the content of trade usages and other commercial standards. See, for
example, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Report and Sec-
ond Draft: The Revised Uniform Sales Act § 59(IXa), (d) at 254 (1941) (setting out matters
to be submitted to merchant experts, including the effects on obligations of "mercantile
usage" or "usage of trade," whether tender was conforming, whether an action was rea-
sonable, or any other "issue which requires for its competent determination special mer-
chants' knowledge rather than general knowledge"). The failure to include a merchant
jury provision in the final Code was due to a need to obtain political support for the pro-
posed Code, not to Llewellyn's abandonment of the concept. See Zipporah Batshaw Wise-
man, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 Harv L Rev 465,
527-29 (1987). Most of the objections to the incorporation strategy put forth in this Article,
however, would not be weaker if a merchant jury provision had been included because
they are not based primarily on the limits of courts' institutional competence.
' See, for example, Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist
Economies, 27 Cornell Intl L J 1, 42-45 (1994) (suggesting that trade associations should
be formed to interpret and enforce contracts according to commercial custom so that, over
time, customs will become sufficiently well developed to supply the basic principles of a
public commercial law). See also Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Na-
ture, 1 J L Econ & Org 5 (1985) (discussing private mechanisms for contract enforcement);
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More broadly, the idea that courts in deciding cases should look
to immanent business norms, consisting of both the practices of
contracting parties and unwritten customs, is a fundamental
tenet of the legal realist approach to contract interpretation, an
approach that was developed, championed, and ultimately codi-
fied by Karl Llewellyn, a leading legal realist and the principal
drafter of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("Code").6
Academic commentators have long debated the proper role of
customary practices in commercial adjudication.' They have ex-
plored the difficulty of defining the parameters of the custom to
be sought, have debated the efficiency of custom,9 have explored
the actual role played by custom in various adjudicatory fora,10
have discussed the extent to which custom was absorbed into the
common law," and have noted the problems of institutional com-
Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U Pa L Rev 1643 (1996) (suggesting that as the
economy increases in complexity it becomes increasingly important for courts to enforce
certain types of business custom). Similarly, commentators have suggested looking to us-
ages of the trade to set standards for electronic commerce. See, for example, Alejandro E.
Almaguer and Roland W. Baggott III, Shaping New Legal Frontiers: Dispute Resolution
for the Internet, 13 Ohio St J Disp Res 711, 714, 716 (1998) (advocating the use of "Self
Regulatory Mechanisms [to] Promote a 'Cyber-Usage of Trade,'" because, "[i]n the age of
mature electronic commercial transactions, parties must be able to rely on custom and us-
age of trade").
' See generally William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement chs 11-12
(Weinenfeld & Nicolson 1973). See also Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 Stan L Rev 621, 624 (1975) ("Llewellyn saw law as an
articulation and regularization of unconsciously evolved mores-a crystallization of a gen-
erally recognized and almost indisputably right rule (a 'singing reason'), inherent in, but
very possibly obscured by, existing patterns of relationships.").
' There is no widely accepted definition of a custom. This Article defines it as an un-
written practice that would be considered a usage of trade under the Code, see UCO § 1-
205, or the type of commercial standard that would be incorporated into a contract or
taken into account in the contract interpretation process under the Code. See note 1. This
Article uses the terms trade practice, usage of trade, and custom interchangeably.
' See, for example, Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in Jody S. Kraus and
Steven D. Walt, eds, The Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law
(Cambridge 1999).
See, for example, Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U Pa
L Rev 1697 (1996) (providing a host of reasons why norms might not be efficient); Jody S.
Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J Legal Stud 277 (1997)
(drawing on a theory of cultural evolution to argue that customary practices are unlikely
to be efficient but may be more nearly optimal than either individual decisions with re-
spect to particular transactions or legislative enactments).
" See, for example, Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes,
and International Commercial Arbitration (1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with U
Chi L Rev).
" See, for example, E. Karl McGinnis, Present Legal and Practical Methods by which
Business Custom is Enforceg, 5 NC L Rev 136 (1927) (discussing various ways of "enforc-
ing" custom including trade association arbitration and incorporation into the common
law).
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petence that might inhibit the accurate determination of the con-
tent of customary practices. 2 However, a more basic and natu-
rally prior question has not been adequately addressed. Namely,
to what extent do the types of industry-specific meanings of
words and the types of unwritten, industry-wide "usages of trade"
and "commercial standards"--that the Code directs courts to in-
corporate into commercial agreements through both gap filling
and the interpretive process-actually exist as to most aspects of
contracting relationships in merchant communities?"
12 See, for example, Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Con-
tractual Consent, 78 Va L Rev 821, 908 n 231 (1992) (noting that "while judges may be
good surrogates for the rationally ignorant consumer, they are often deficient interpreters
of more specialized usages of trade").
13 The Code was assumed to be based on a solid empirical foundation. William A.
Schnader, a primary mover behind the Code project, chose Karl Llewellyn as Chief Re-
porter because
[n]ot only was Professor Llewellyn a student of commercial law as it appeared in the
law books, but he was the type of law professor who was never satisfied unless he
knew exactly how commercial transactions were carried on in the market place. He
insisted that the provisions of the Code should be drafted from the standpoint of what
actually takes place from day to day in the commercial world rather than from the
standpoint of what appeared in statutes and decisions.
William A- Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 U Miami L Rev 1, 14 (1967) (UCC Symposium). However, with the
exception of seeking (and then ignoring) the opinions of merchants in hearings on the
Code (see note 146 and text accompanying notes 144-47), rigorous empirical research into
what types of rules would actually be responsive to merchant concerns was never under-
taken. While Llewellyn's defenders recognize that the lack of an empirical basis for the
Code was inconsistent with his realist and scientific approach to law as well as his often-
expressed position that in drafting a commercial code attention should be paid to the
"wide basis of established commercial experience," Twining, Karl Llewellyn at 524 (cited
in note 6), they are quick to point out that "critics who have been suspicious of Llewellyn's
alleged 'unscientific', 'impressionistic' or 'anecdotal' approach to facts have yet to point to
any major factual assumptions of the Code that were misleading or inaccurate. Nor have
suggestions been forthcoming as to specific empirical research that might have been worth
doing." Id at 319. See also the comment of Robert Summers in id at 467 ("I think the big-
gest and best reason for lack of empirical research is this: most of the law is 'suppletive'
law-it applies only when the parties have not agreed as to the matter in hand. It says
what the law is when the parties don't say."). This Article, together with earlier work on
other industries, see Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U Pa L Rev 1765 (1996), and Lisa Bern-
stein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Value Creation Through Rules,
Norms, and Institutions (Sept 8, 1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with U Chi L Rev),
suggests that the lack of solid empirical research led Code drafters to adopt provisions
that are detrimental rather than accommodating to merchant concerns, and to a commer-
cial law based on a deeply flawed understanding of merchant reality.
It should be noted that Llewellyn was aware of the sources discussed in this Article. In
a memorandum he presented in defense of the proposed Code's battle of the forms provi-
sion, UCC § 2-207, he cited the existence of similar provisions in merchant trade rules in
support of his position; yet when these sources did not support the position he was advo-
cating, Llewellyn neglected to mention them. Karl N. Llewellyn, Memorandum by K.N.
Llewellyn Replying to the Report and Memorandum of Task Group 1 of the Special Corn-
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Starting from the generally accepted premise that unwritten
commercial customs are most likely to arise and endure in situa-
tions where transactors interact on a repeat basis, over a long pe-
riod of time, in relatively similar transactions,14 this Article ad-
dresses the question from a largely empirical perspective.15 In
mittee of the Commerce and Industry Association of New York, Inc., on the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, in Study of Uniform Commercial Code Memoranda presented to the Com-
mission and Stenographic Report of Public Hearing on Article 2 of the Code 42, 56-57
(1954), reprinted in State of New York, 1 Report of the Law Revision Commissioner for
1954 and Record of Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code 106, 121 (Williams 1954).
In addition, Llewellyn's early writings show that he was aware of the existence of these
private legal systems. See, for example, Karl N. Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions
Upon Economics, 15 Am Econ Rev 665, 672, 673 n 24 (1925) ("Increasingly, associations
are forming which adopt their own rules of action and even settle their own disputes ....
And the rules which... such associations lay down and apply, are part of the body of our
law. * ** [T]he association-made rules are like enough to law to deserve careful atten-
tion.").
" These preconditions for the emergence of custom are widely accepted. Several addi-
tional factors, such as that the transactors play reciprocal roles in the transaction (in the
commercial law setting this means that they are buyers one day and sellers the next), and
that most transactions are among members of an ethnically homogeneous or geographi-
cally concentrated small group, are said to make the emergence of custom more likely but
are not strictly required. For endorsements of these criteria, see Richard A. Epstein, The
Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J Legal
Stud 1, 11-16 (1992) ("[T]he key variables on the emergence of custom seem to be the
symmetry of results and the frequency of the dispute with the question of severity of the
loss playing a secondary role."); Bruce L. Benson, Customary Law as a Social Contract: In-
ternational Commercial Law, 3 Const Pol Econ 1, 7 (1992) (endorsing these criteria as cor-
responding to the game theoretic conditions for the emergence of commercial custom and
cooperation). See also Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Dis-
putes (Harvard 1991). Although the merchant industries discussed in this Article do not
perfectly fulfill the conditions theorists identify as being ideal for the emergence of cus-
tom, they come far closer to doing so than most contemporary industries whose disputes
are adjudicated under the Code's merchant rules.
"s Most commentators simply assert or assume the existence of custom. See, for exam-
ple, Berman and Dasser, The 'New" Law Merchant at 28, 32 (cited in note 3) ("Yet, that
should not stop us from seeing what is right in front of our noses! It is the factual exis-
tence of international custom and its continuous use.., that allows us to speak of inter-
national trade as a special type of international law. * * * Nobody denies that there is a
body of international rules, founded on the commercial understandings and contract prac-
tices of an international community principally composed of mercantile, shipping, insur-
ance, and banking enterprises of all countries."); id at 25 ("[Clustomary commercial un-
derstandings enjoy almost total recognition .... [notwithstanding the fact that] [sluch
rules may not be very conspicuous and may easily be overlooked by scholars."). The only
notable exceptions are Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary In-
ternational Law, 66 U Chi L Rev (forthcoming 1999) (drawing on game theoretic models
and fact-based case studies to suggest that customary international law does not exist);
Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist? (cited in note 8) (questioning whether trade customs
can be given content by adjudicators independent of "the goals, beliefs and other norma-
tive premises of the person doing the identifying," and concluding that they cannot be-
cause the problems faced by a court "finding" the content of a custom are analytically
similar to the problems faced by a court trying to find the content of the common law). See
also Leon E. Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution of Commercial Law 45-60 (Fred
B. Rothman 1983) (attempting to empirically establish the existence of custom in interna-
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keeping with Llewellyn's view that commercial law should reflect
merchant reality, 6 it identifies several merchant industries-hay,
grain and feed, textiles, and silk-that in an early stage of their
development were roughly characterized by conditions favorable
to the emergence of customs. It then explores the attempts of na-
tional trade associations in these industries to codify their indus-
tries' customs into written trade rules.
The debates surrounding these codification efforts suggest
that there was not widespread agreement among merchants as to
either the meaning of common terms of trade or the content of
many basic commercial practices. Rules committee debates some-
times went on for years, customs relating to important aspects of
transactions were left uncodified because consensus could not be
achieved, and in most industries drafting committees eventually
engaged in only selective codification. In addition, over time,
many associations came to explicitly concede that they were at-
tempting to change rather than merely incorporate existing prac-
tices.
These findings, together with interview evidence and the tes-
timony of merchant associations on the proposed Commercial
Code, suggest that "usages of trade" and "commercial standards,"
as those terms are used by the Code, may not consistently exist,
even in relatively close-knit merchant communities. While mer-
chants in the industries examined here sometimes do and did act
in ways amounting to loose behavioral regularities, most such
regularities are either much more geographically local in nature
or far more general in scope and conditional in form than is com-
monly assumed.'7 These industries' efforts at codification, and the
tional oil contracts). But see Chris Williams, The Search for Bases of Decision in Commer-
cial Law: Llewellyn Redux, 97 Harv L Rev 1495, 1501-04 (1984) (book review) (arguing
that Trakman's evidence does not establish the existence of custom).
18 See, for example, Walter D. Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code: A Report on
Developments During the Period from May 1950 through February 1951, 6 Bus Law 113,
126 (1951) (quoting the Report of the Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code: "the
practices of businessmen and business houses are important factors in construing their
contracts and actions and in determining their rights and liabilities .... [Miany of the
changes effected by the Code are designed to adapt rules of law to the way that business is
actually carried on"). See also National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Report and Second Draft: The Revised Uniform Sales Act § 59 at 253 (cited in note
4) (noting, in a comment thought to have been drafted by Llewellyn, that while "the law
about the effect of 'business custom' is quite... uncertain... [tihat has not been because
any sane Court has for half-a-century doubted the wisdom of fully incorporating the rele-
vant usage of trade into the agreement and into the decision on adequacy of perform-
ance").
" Although commentators have long recognized local differences in customary prac-
tices, many have dismissed them as trivial without providing any supporting examples.
See Benson, 3 Const Pol Econ at 15 & n 9 (cited in note 14) (arguing that the law mer-
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subsequent operation of modern merchant-run private legal sys-
tems, also suggest that merchants differentiate between written
and unwritten customs and that their understanding of custom-
ary practices is both different from and far more nuanced than
Llewellyn's.
The understanding of merchant reality gained by looking at
these codification debates, together with other merchant-related
sources, suggests that given the Code's flawed empirical basis, it
may be time to reconceptualize the role played by custom in
commercial transactions and to rethink the wisdom of the Code's
incorporation-based approach to gap filling and contract interpre-
tation," an approach that is endorsed and strengthened in cur-
rent drafts of proposed revisions to the Code, 9 drafts that repre-
sent the undeserved triumph of legal realism in commercial law.
To this end, this Article proposes an alternative conception of
the types of customs and practices that do exist and the role they
play in commercial relationships. It suggests that while the types
of generally agreed-upon practices that Llewellyn thought mer-
chants viewed as supplying implicit contract provisions do not
consistently exist, merchants do consider it valuable to have an
understanding of the ways transactions are usually done, an un-
chant protected merchants "against the vagaries of local laws and customs," thereby rec-
ognizing the existence of these differences, but dismissing them as "reflect[ing only] differ-
ential preferences for relatively minor variations and commercial practices and institu-
tions").
"S Merchant tribunals' rejection of the incorporation strategy does not necessarily un-
dermine the "situation sense" component of Llewellyn's jurisprudence. See generally
James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk. A Note on Llewellyn's German
Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 Yale L J 156 (1987) (describing the origins
and content of Llewellyn's notion of situation sense). The opinions produced by merchant
tribunals reveal that arbitrators' background knowledge of the trade may enable them to
better assess the credibility of testimony and may give them a better understanding of the
types of evidence that ought to be submitted. Because most merchant legal systems
authorize arbitrators to request additional information in lieu of giving the parties a right
of discovery, arbitrators' background understanding of transactional practices should en-
able them to intelligently exercise this authority.
' See Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, PEB Study
Group, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2: Preliminary Report 16-17 (1990) (After re-
viewing the present Code's incorporation strategy and its use of open-ended terms like
"reasonable" and "seasonable," the Study Group "endorses the drafting style utilized in
Article 2 and recommends that the general sales policies ... be retained.... We recom-
mend that the Drafting Committee consider ways beyond those recommended by the
Study Group to articulate these policies and to improve their implementation. The objec-
tive is to achieve a more complete utilization of them by the parties and the courts in the
resolution of commercial disputes."). See also id at 9, 32 (emphasizing that the Code's pro-
vision on course of dealing and usage of trade "is a crucial component of the [Code's] broad
definition of agreement," and recommending that the section on course of performance or
practical construction be moved to Article 1, because "[tihis important principle of inter-
pretation should not be limited to contracts for the sale of goods").
Questionable Empirical Basis
derstanding gleaned from a rough aggregation of practices in the
market as a whole. It then argues that these types of under-
standings, which this Article refers to as weak-form customs,
provide transactors with a pool of common knowledge that in the
early stages of their contracting relationship enables them to bet-
ter assess whether the other transactor is a cooperator or a defec-
tor, thereby facilitating the emergence and maintenance of re-
peat-dealing cooperative contracting relationships. On this view,
weak-form customs, which are different from the strong-form
Hayekian customs' whose existence is assumed by the Code, can
be understood as providing transactors with a set of vaguely de-
fined yet workable relationship-creating norms that initially add
tremendous value to contracting relationships but that gradually
diminish in importance as contracting relationships mature.
Part I of this Article looks at several associations' attempts to
codify custom and discusses the methodological limitations of
drawing conclusions from the codification debates. Part II briefly
revisits and critiques the justifications that have been developed
for the incorporation strategy. Part III proposes a theory of the
relationship-creating role played by weak-form customs in com-
mercial transactions. It then provides suggestive, though not con-
clusive, evidence that it is both a plausible and analytically useful
account of merchant interactions. Part IV concludes that while
some industry-wide usages of trade do exist, and highly local cus-
toms might have existed, the pervasive existence of usages of
trade and commercial standards, whose geographic reach is coex-
tensive with the reach of the relevant trade, is a legal fiction
rather than a merchant reality. It therefore suggests that new
justifications for the Code's interpretive approach and gap-filling
methodology are needed.
I. TRADE ASSOCIATIONS' ATEMPTS TO CODIFY CUSTOM
Between 1860 and the mid-1900s, a period during which
many merchant industries had already become significantly na-
tional in scope, numerous national trade associations created pri-
vate arbitration tribunals and soon thereafter began to codify in-
dustry practices into written trade rules.2' These rules typically
state that they are either codifications" or selective codifications
See notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
"For an overview of the operation of these private legal systems that includes a dis-
cussion of their substantive rules, adjudicative procedures, and adjudicative approaches,
see Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, in Peter Newman, ed, 3 The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics and the Law 108 (Stockton 1998).
" See, for example, The American Yarn Spinners Association, Inc ("AYSA"), The Yarn
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of industry customs,'m or attempts either to clarify, or to achieve
uniformity in, industry practices.24 The preambles to many sets of
trade rules explicitly state that their goal is to reduce the number
of commercial misunderstandings that arise by clarifying the
scope and content of contractual obligations.' In most industries,
these trade rules provide a detailed set of contract default rules
covering most aspects of contract formation, performance, and
breach.
In most associations, trade rules are drafted and subse-
quently amended by committees of experienced industry mem-
bers who serve without compensation and are either appointed by
the board of directors or directly elected by the membership. In
many industries, both the original rules and subsequent amend-
ments are subject to floor debate at the associations' annual con-
ventions' and must be approved by a specified percentage of the
membership as a whole.'
Rules of 1989 Introduction (AYSA-1989) ("For more than fifty years, members of the Yarn
industry have utilized industry rules regarding contract terms and conditions and indus-
try norms for the sale of yarns. The Yarn Rules have been used as a statement of trade
practice and from time to time have been revised to reflect developments in the industry
over the years. The Yarn Rules and the customary contract terms are recommended to
serve as a reference to members of the yarn industry of trade practices commonly in use
throughout the industry.").
See, for example, Rubber Trade Association of New York, Inc, General Rules Prefa-
tory Note (revised 1978) ("The compilation is the result of a study of the usages and cus-
toms that have developed in the trade and, in the opinion of the Association, is representa-
tive of those terms and conditions of sale which will eliminate misunderstandings between
buyer and seller.").
24 See, for example, American Fats and Oils Association, Inc, By-Laws Art I, 'Pur-
pose," reprinted in American Fats and Oils Association, Inc, Trading and Arbitration
Rules Bylaws, Roster (1994) ("to work toward uniformity and certainty in... the customs
and usages of the trade); Association of Food Industries, Inc, Fact Sheet "Objectives" (no
publication date) ("To seek uniformity and certainty in the customs and usage of the
trade. "); The Cocoa Merchants' Association of America, Inc, By-Laws Art II, "Purpose" (re-
vised Oct 29, 1993) ("to procure uniformity and certainty in the customs and usage of the
trade"); Charter and By-Laws of the Greenwood Cotton Exchanges Charter No 7 (1957) ("to
establish... uniform usages, rules and regulations"); Charter Constitution and By-Laws
of the Memphis Cotton Exchange 5 (1992) ("to maintain uniformity in its rules, regulations
and usages"); American Eeed Trade Association ("ASTA"), Bylaws Art I, "Purposes" (as
amended Apr 15, 1989) (to "assist in the promulgation of trade rules, practices and cus-
toms for those engaged in the industry"); Association of Crafts and Creative Industries,
Bylaws Art H, "Objectives" §§ 1-2 (1994) (to "foster equity and business usages ... [iun fur-
therance of these purposes ... the Association shall have power *** [to advance lawful
and fair trade practices, customs and usages").
See, for example, American Peanut Shellers Association, Official Trading Rules:
Farmers Stock, Domestic and Export 2 (May 1994) (noting that the rules were adopted to
"make more definite the terms of contracts of purchase and sale"). See also note 33.
"See, for example, National Hay Association, Report on the Twelfth Annual Conven-
tion (1905) (reporting debates verbatim). Other associations mail copies of proposed
changes to their members or print proposed changes in trade publications.
Many by-laws also give each member firm (regardless of its size) one vote on pro-
Questionable Empirical Basis
This Part explores the efforts of trade associations in core
merchant industries to codify their commercial customs into
trade rules. It finds that, contrary to the assumptions of the Code
drafters, even in close-knit communities merchant transactors do
not, except within very local spheres' or in very general ways,
have similar views about the meaning of common contractual
terms or the content of precisely those types of commercial stan-
dards and usages of trade that the Code and its Official Com-
ments direct courts to take into account in deciding cases.
A. Hay
The National Hay Association ("NHA")' was formed in
1895.' It began arbitrating cases in 1899"' and adopted its first
posed trade rules. At the National Grain and Feed Association ("NGFA"), trade rules may
be temporarily amended by a vote of two-thirds of the Board of Directors, Bylaws of the
NGFA Art XVIH, § 2, reprinted in NGFA, NGFA Trading and Trade Rules Seminar
(1994) (no pagination in original), subject to "an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the vot-
ing power present at the next annual meeting of the Members," id at § 1 (see also id at
§ 3), with each "Active member and each Affiliated member... entitled to one vote," id at
Art IV, § 1 (see also § .2). In associations with this voting structure, even if large firms con-
trol the rules committees, it will be difficult for them to secure passage of rules that are
greatly biased in their direction. On the other hand, if they do control most committees,
small firms would have a hard time even getting the rules they might want onto the
agenda. It is, however, important to note that in some associations, proposed rules and
rules amendments must be approved by a sellers' group and a buyers' group. See, for ex-
ample, American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc ("ATMI") and American Cotton
Shippers Association ("ACSA), The Southern Mill Rules for Buying and Selling of Ameri-
can Cotton 32 (ATMI & ACSA 1995) (requiring the approval of members of the ACSA and
the ATMI).
Most by-laws provide for annual review of the trade rules, but the actual frequency of
rules amendments varies widely. See NGFA, Trade Rules and Arbitration Rules 3 (pam-
phlet) (1995) (noting that the Grain Rules were amended fifty-nine times and the Feed
Rules thirty-three times). See also note 84 (Worth Street Rules) and notes 116, 120, and
122 (silk rules).
"In the context of the incorporation debates, there are also reasons to be skeptical
about strong statements suggesting that local customs exist. If, for example, a transactor
is arguing for adoption of a particular rule (especially one that is favorable to his locality
rather than simply to a subset of firms in it), he might invoke the alleged universality of
the practice in his locality to give his argument legitimacy and persuasive force.
"The N-A is "made up of producers, dealers, brokers and representatives of related
industry..... (It] is dedicated to the development and maintenance of better quality hay
and improved marketing practices." NHA, National Hay Association (Association brochure
mailed to author in 1997).
" At the time the NHA was formed, the interstate trade in hay was fairly well-
established, having begun in the 1840s. See William J. Reinke, Arbitration in the National
Hay Association 2 (1955) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, on file
with the University of Chicago Libraries) ("The shipment and marketing of hay is reported
to have originated in the 1840's.").
" In 1897, a by-law amendment to provide for arbitration was proposed and appar-
ently was adopted. N-A, Report of the Fourth Annual Meeting 46 (1897). Full Association
records from 1898 to 1900 are unavailable, but the amendment appears in the 1901 Con-
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set of trade rules in 1907, after two years of work on the project.32
The goal of the rules creation process was not to memorialize al-
ready uniform customary practices, but rather to prevent dis-
putes by actively promoting uniformity.' Prior to the adoption of
the rules:
[P]acking, shipping and handling hay was an irregular busi-
ness. There were no established customs to govern, and
every transaction was typical of the parties engaged in it.
Balers and shippers followed the bent of their own inclina-
tion in the details of baling, weighing, buying and shipping,
and distributing markets also points of consumption, were
under local influences and often dominated by whimsical no-
tions, and at the same point of shipment, or in the same re-
ceiving market there was irregularity of method or consis-
tency in business.'
In fact, hay transactors were not even able to agree on the
meaning of trade terms as basic as "bale" and "No. 1 Hay." As one
industry participant noted:
What is a bale of No. 1 hay? There is not a man in this room
who can tell you. Put twenty bales of different grades of hay
along that room, and there will not be five men among you
who will agree. You have decided that a ton of No. I hay may
contain not over one fifth of tame grasses. A gentlemen
spoke up and said as his opinion that tame grass is clover. If
you know anything, you know that a bale of hay with one-
stitution and By-Laws, Art XIV(2), reprinted in NHA, Report of the Eighth Annual Meet-
ing 48 (1901), and the 1899 Report contains a lament that the "Committee on Arbitration
and Investigation has little power," suggesting that the arbitration amendment had been
adopted. NI-A, Report of the Sixth Annual Meeting 185 (1899). Prior to the Arbitration
Committee, the Association created an Investigation Committee that was empowered to
investigate and sanction instances of "uncommercial conduct." NRA, Constitution and By-
Laws Art X, reprinted in NRA, Report of the Second Annual Meeting 32 (1895). The work
of this Committee continued even after the Arbitration Committee was formed.
' NRA, Report of the Eleventh Annual Convention 154-55 (1905) ("I move that the in-
coming President appoint a committee of five to draft trade rules governing the contracts
for the purchase and sale of hay.").
See NHA, Report of the Twelfth Annual Convention 170 (1906) ("[D]isputes are more
apt to arise, owing to misunderstandings than to anything else. I think a majority of the
people mean to do right, but misunderstandings will creep in. Therefore it seems very im-
portant that this Association should have trade rules."). See also NHA, Constitution and
By-Laws "Preamble," reprinted in NRA, Report of the Second Annual Meeting 29 (1895)
(declaring that a goal of the association is to "use our best efforts to have established and
maintained uniformity in commercial usages and in the grades of hay and straw in the dif-
ferent markets of the country"); NHA, Constitution "Preamble," reprinted in NHA, Report
of the Eighth Annual Meeting 42 (1901) (reaffirming the Association's commitment "to use
our best efforts to have established and maintained uniformity in commercial usage").
' NRA, Report of the Eighteenth Annual Convention 3 (1911).
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fifth clover is clovery mixed hay. No. 1 hay should be pure
timothy.-"
And, as another observed:
The large bales of New York and New England means a dif-
ferent bale from the large bale in the Western States, and
the same is true of the small bales. In Chicago at present
there is a lack of clear definition of small bales.'
The debates surrounding the adoption and amendment of the
hay rules also suggest that there were no agreed-upon usages in
relation to some of the precise aspects of a standard transaction
that the Code and its Official Comments explicitly direct courts to
discern by reference to usage of trade or commercial standards.
For example, the Code provides that when the time for "de-
livery or any other action under a contract" is not specified, it
"shall be a reasonable time,"37 determined by reference to "coin-
= NHA, Report of the Fourth Annual Meeting 40 (1897). See also N-A, Report of the
Twenty-Seventh Annual Convention 54 (1920) ("[T~here is at present no uniform grade or
at least no uniformly interpreted grade that can be used as a medium for making sales or
purchases of hay in territories remote from each other. What is considered as No. 1 timo-
thy, for example, in one producing section may be considered as No. 2 timothy in another
producing section, and still of another grade in the consuming section to which it may be
shipped."); N-A, Report of the Eighteenth Annual Convention 154 (1911) ("The hay trade
of this country will not be on a sound basis, on an honest basis, until No. I hay is No. 1
hay East, West, North, and South."); N-A, Report of the Twelfth Annual Convention 37
(1905) ("Grades cannot be expected to suit the South, North, East and West with the same
degree of satisfaction."). Disputes over grade were not due merely to subjective disagree-
ments about quality assessments, but rather were due, in part, to the fact that different
markets defined the same grade differently. NHA, Report of the Twenty-Eighth Annual
Convention 70-75 (1921) (recounting a long debate as to whether "Choice" hay or No. 1 hay
is the highest grade, with some participants questioning whether "Choice" was even a rec-
ognized grade designation); NRA, Report of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Convention 74-77
(1920) (comparing the grading requirements of eleven sets of association and exchange
grading rules and finding wide differences).
N-RA, Report of the Tenth Annual Convention 76 (1903). See also id at 80 ("[Blales
are not governed by size so much as by weight in the Northwest. In Chicago, I know, they
like light bales, weighing from eighty-five to ninety-five pounds; and in the East they like
heavier bales. In Wisconsin they will put in 125 to 135 pounds, and that makes a pretty
heavy bale."); NHA, Report of the Fourteenth Annual Convention 72 (1907) ("[T]here is no
general definition of the terms as a Small Bale in one section may mean a Medium Bale in
another, or a Medium Bale a Small Bale in another, a Medium Bale a Large Bale in an-
other and so on."). The causes of this disagreement were partly technological since differ-
ent hay baling machines produced different size bales of hay. Similar disagreements ex-
isted in other industries. See, for example, ASTA Yearbook 59 (1914) ("Seedsmen handle
large quantities of... seeds.., for few of which legal weights per bushel have been es-
tablished. They have, therefore, to arrive at customary weights only, which vary in the dif-
ferent States.") (emphasis added). The weight associated with the designation "bale" in the
silk industry also varied from country to country. See Revision of Raw Silk Rules Com-
pleted, 3 Silkworm 76 (May 1921).
UCC § 2-309.
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mercial standards," "acceptable commercial conduct," and "usage
of trade.' 3s However, the debate over a proposed rule, which
would determine when certain freight charges had to be re-
quested, reveals that.there was no agreement as to what a rea-
sonable time might be. 9 As one participant opined, "that 'reason-
able time' business will not [tell] anything. You might as well
leave it out."0 And, in response to a suggestion that a more defi-
nite rule be adopted, one transactor proposed "nine months," an-
other "fifteen days," and still another, "within ten days after the
freight bills have been paid."4'
Prior to adoption of the rules, there was also widespread
disagreement about the meaning of the type of common contrac-
tual language that the Code and its Official Comments direct
courts to interpret "as meaning what it may fairly be expected to
mean to parties," which is determined, in part, by looking to "us-
age of trade as a factor in reaching the commercial meaning." 2
For example, while hay contracts tended to include delivery time
provisions like "prompt" or "immediate," provisions the Code
would look to usage to define,43 there was no consensus as to what
Id at § 2-309 cmt 1. See, for example, Superior Boiler Works, Inc v R.J. Sanders, Inc,
711 A2d 628, 636 (RI 1998) ("In the usual case the question of what constitutes a reason-
able time under the UCC is one for the finder of fact to determine from ... [several fac-
tors, including] usages of trade in the pertinent industry."); Jamestown Terminal Elevator,
Inc v Hieb, 246 NW2d 736, 740 (ND 1976) (holding that "based on the previous 'course of
dealing' of the parties and the industry's 'usage of trade', the jury could determine that
August 31, 1973, was a 'reasonable time' for delivery").
"See NHA, Report of the Sixdeenth Annual Convention 220 (1909) (observing that
"[t]he word 'ample' [as used in a rule requiring "ample margin"] may not have the same
meaning in the minds of different people"); NRA, Report of the Twenty-Eighth Annual
Convention 68 (1921) ("You will see at the end of each paragraph 'well baled.' That term is
so indefinite .... There should be something more definite brought into it."); id ("I think
the words 'good color' might be stricken out and insert something which the inspector or
shipper or buyer will know what it means.").
4, NHA, Report of the Sixteenth Annual Convention 229 (1909).
41 Id at 222-23. Only one participant spoke in favor of the reasonable time proposal,
saying "[i]f it requires fifteen days in their market that is a reasonable time for them. If it
can be done in three days in another place that is reasonable time in their market. I think
anyone can readily form an opinion of what reasonable time is." Id at 223.
"' UCC § 1-205 cmt 4. See also id at § 1-205 cmt 1 ("This Act rejects both the 'lay dic-
tionary' and the 'coveyancer's' reading of a commercial agreement. Instead the meaning of
the agreement of the parties is to be determined by the language used by them and by
their actions, read and interpreted in light of commercial practices and other surrounding
circumstances.").
' See, for example, Kreglinger & Fernau v Charles J. Webb Sons Co, 162 F Supp 695,
697 (E D Pa 1957) (noting that the "whole controversy centers around the single question,
What did the parties intend when they inserted the word 'prompt' in the contract?" and
looking to trade usage to define "prompt" but concluding that no usage existed because the
plaintiff contended it meant "by the first available ship" and defendant that it meant
thirty days), affd, 255 F2d 680 (3d Cir 1958).
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those terms meant.' This lack of consensus led to many misun-
derstandings. The trade rules were conceived of as a way to avoid
such misunderstandings by providing "a sort of dictionary to
which all the members of this Association can go.""
The hay industry codification debates also suggest that some
of the Code rules relating to the formation of contracts that rely
on trade usage and commercial standards for their substance
may be problematic. For example, the Code directs courts to look
to "commercial standards on the point of 'indefiniteness'"4 in de-
termining whether an agreement is sufficiently definite to be en-
forced. However, hay arbitrators, like merchant arbitrators in
many industries,' routinely point out that contracts ought to be
far more detailed than they are and frequently chastise parties
for entering into unduly vague agreements 8
See NRA, Report of the Twelfth Annual Convention 155 (1905) (quoting a member as
stating: "Suppose ... I should purchase of a shipper a carload of hay for prompt shipment.
Technically that means nothing. It does mean something if I purchase a car of oats on the
... floor" of an official exchange with written trade rules) (emphasis added). Similarly, the
Code defines a "commercial unit" in terms of "commercial usage," explicitly noting that it
may be defined in terms of "a quantity [such as] a bale... or carload." UCC § 2-105(6).
However, in the hay industry there was no accepted meaning of either "bale" or "carload."
In 1905, in a debate over whether trade rules should be adopted, one participant noted
that "[i]t is a very grave question of doubt in any state what is meant by the shipment of
ten cars." N-A, Report of the Twelfth Annual Convention 156 (1905). And, in 1910, the
Arbitration Committee decided to "respectfully recommend that [the NHA] establish a
rule to be added to our Trade Rules in which the number of tons of hay is specified that
shall constitute a contract carload," NHA, Report of the Seventeenth Annual Convention 67
(1910), but the issue was not fully debated until 1921. NRA, Report of the Twenty-Eighth
Annual Convention 85 (1921) (recounting the debate over the meaning of the term "car-
load," with some people saying it meant "10 tons" and others asserting "12 tons"). See note
69 and accompanying text.
NHA, Report of the Twelfth Annual Convention 155 (1905).
UCC § 2-204 cmt.
See, for example, Hinson v Parker Grain Co, NGFA Arbitration Case No 1628
(NGFA 1986) ("The arbitration panel was unanimous in wishing to caution the trade as to
the necessity of using well-thought-out contracts that clearly encompass all of the obliga-
tions of beth buyers and sellers to each other."); ASTA Yearbook 164 (1927) ("Counsel has
rarely, if ever, seen a so-called business-man's contract which was not shy of some desir-
able provision.").
' H.H. Driggs v Walters Bros, in NHA, Report of the Eleventh Annual Convention 145-
46 (1905) ("[W]e find many of the terms of a contract of this kind ambiguous and indefi-
nite."); NHA, Report of the Thirtieth Annual Convention 59, 61 (1923) (where the arbitra-
tion committee noted: "There is one suggestion I would like to leave with you and it is
this-in making your sales and purchases pay more attention to trade rules No. 1 [setting
out what a contract should specify] and No. 2 [dealing with sending confirmations]. * * *
Make definite contracts and observe your trade rules, and when this is done membership
in The National Hay Association will be a real asset to your individual business"); NRA,
Report of the Twenty-Ninth Annual Convention 108 (1922) ("We [the Arbitration Commit-
tee] are impressed that in most all cases trouble arises from the fact that contracts are
carelessly made and too much is taken for granted by the contracting parties. It might be
well to adopt a slogan, 'Take nothing for granted.' Both parties to a contract should file
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Despite these disagreements over the content of general us-
ages and the meaning of common contractual language, a few
general usages may have existed,49 and local pockets of customary
practice were not uncommon. Many rule adoption and amend-
ment debates, such as those relating to grading and inspection,
took the form of debates among representatives of different re-
gions and localities," each with their own practices." In some lo-
calities these customs took the form of unwritten practices, while
in others they were codified in the rules of local hay associations
or commodities exchanges.
More generally, much of the impetus for both codification
and rule amendments came from members of the NHA's arbitra-
written confirmation, clearly defining all specifications and details governing said con-
tract. All modifications should also be confirmed in writing and many cases for arbitration
would be eliminated."); NHA Committee on Arbitration, Case 676, in NHA, Report of the
Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention 140, 141 (1921) ("This controversy arises principally
because plaintiff's confirmation in regard to time of shipment was indefinite, and further
defendants also exercised gross carelessness in respect to confirmation in accordance with
custom and trade rules.&"); NIHA, Report of the Twenty-Fifth Annual Convention 131 (1918)
(noting "the fact that 75% of the cases which come before this [Arbitration] Committee
would be avoided if contracts were made definite as to the time of shipment, grade,
weights, and proper confirmations mailed by both parties"); NHA, Report of the Seven-
teenth Annual Convention 48 (1910) (where the arbitration committee attributed the ris-
ing number of cases to the use of "poor and faulty contract[s]" and recommended the adop-
tion of an association-drafted "uniform explicit and binding contract for the use of its
members").
, For example, in most cash commodities industries, price adjustments were often
given for slightly nonconforming tender. See, for example, TB. Jones & Co v Henderson
Elevator Co (NGFA 1904), reprinted in NGFA, Decisions of the Arbitration and Appeals
Committees of the Grain Dealers National Association 23-25 (1920) (In a dispute over re-
jection of an off grade delivery of corn, the arbitrators held that while "[c]ustom has held
that where off grade grain is shipped, discounts may often permit contracts to be filled by
applying such cars or quantities that are not equal to contract grade to be applied on con-
tract at a difference. But there is no rule in the grain trade making it obligatory on the
purchaser to accept such lower grades of grain.").
While some of the practices so debated had distributional consequences, others such
as how to define the quality associated with each grade designation-see, for example,
NHA, Report of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Convention 74 (1920) (comparing grade rules
of eleven sets of exchange rules)-related to routine matters where only coordination was
important but transactors nonetheless fought for their preferred definitions. See id at 46-
50 (debating grade changes). Similar obstinance was exhibited in the grain industry. See
17 Who is Who in the Grain Trade 31, 33 (Jan 5, 1927-28) ("WWGT") (After noting that
many local rules relating to shipping time contradicted the Grain Dealers National Rules,
the chairman of the Trade Rules Committee stated that "in taking the matter up with the
markets that differ we find on a whole that they are very conservative and tenacious in
maintaining their rules but we are working on the question and gradually obtaining re-
sults.").
" See, for example, NRA, Report of the Fourth Annual Convention 24-25 (1897) ("[We
are old fashioned folks at Boston, and this Association must not forget one thing, that
what is applicable to one section of the country is not applicable to another."); NHA, Re-
port of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention 68-72 (1921) (containing a debate over
grades that emphasizes the existence of regional differences).
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tion committee who sought clearer guidance about how to decide
cases.52 Although hay arbitrators took unwritten custom into ac-
count in filling gaps, they often did so with some reluctance and
the industry itself had a strong preference for clear and bright-
line rules.'
B. Grain and Feed
The National Grain and Feed Association ("NGFA) M was
formed in 1896' and began arbitrating disputes shortly thereaf-
ter.' It adopted the first Grain Trade Rules in 1902 and the first
Feed Trade Rules in 1921. Achieving uniformity of rules and
practices was an important goal of the rule adoption and amend-
ment process.'7
Prior to the national rules, the written trade rules of differ-
ent local markets varied widely,". and unwritten customs were
" NHA, Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting 154 (1905) ("We wished to recommend
the adoption of trade rules. We think it necessary for this Association to have trade rules
printed. It would simplify the work of the Arbitration Committee and would make less
work for that committee to do.").
"Id at 74 ("We should always keep in mind the benefits which associations like the
Chicago Board of Trade and the New York Stock Exchange confer on their members, are
due to their rigid rules, the basis of which is business integrity and mutual interest.").
The NGFA, formerly the Grain Dealers National Association, is a trade association
"for the North American grain and feed industry." Today, it has "more than 1,100 [mem-
ber] companies ... that store, handle, merchandize and process more than two-thirds of
all U.S. grains." David C. Barrett, Jr., Arbitrating Agricultural Disputes: The National
Grain and Feed Association's Experience 1-2, reprinted in NGFA, NGFA Trading Seminar
(no pagination in original) (cited in note 27). For a more detailed description of the indus-
try's contemporary private legal system, see Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1771-87 (cited
in note 13).
" Cross-country trade in grain was already common by the 1840s and accelerated
quickly after the growth of railroads in 1898. William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chi-
cago and the Great West ch 3 (Norton 1991). Many grain traders were buyers one day and
sellers the next, whereas in feed markets many transactions were between merchant sell-
ers and end users.
" However, the first written arbitration opinion was not issued until 1902. Randall C.
Gordon, A Century of Agricultural Abundance Through Free Enterprise: A Centennial Ob-
servance of the National Grain and Feed Association 53 (NGFA 1996). Prior to this time,
numerous local associations had their own arbitration tribunals. Today, however, in the
cash trade, only the Pacific Northwest Grain Exchange, the Los Angeles Grain Exchange,
the Colorado Grain and Feed Association, and the Texas Grain and Feed Association con-
tinue to conduct their own arbitrations.
' President Clement Makes Committee Appointments, 10 WWGT 25 (Nov 20, 1920-21)
("After your committee has drafted trade rules and regulations which have been adopted
by your Association, we recommend that your Association suggest to the various ex-
changes of this country that they in turn adopt these same rules and regulations so as to
insure uniformity in transactions in mill feed.").
" Gordon, A Century of Agricultural Abundance at 49 (cited in note 56) ("[W]hen the
Grain Dealers National Association was founded... each terminal market and grain ex-
change operated under its own set of trading rules and dispute-resolution procedures.
Very little consistency existed between the trading rules of different markets"). In addi-
The University of Chicago Law Review [66:710
nonuniform even within particular localities." As a grain dealer
observed at the 1901 convention, many grain men "differ in
opinion. Their ideas concerning what should and should not be
done under certain conditions varies as much as the markets
themselves." ° The divergence in opinion over the content of in-
dustry-wide trade practices was so wide that "a high probability
existed that a dispute would arise whenever grain was traded
outside local markets."6' More generally, as a transactor noted in
an article published before the rules were drafted:
tion, the rules of local associations and exchanges were not regarded as necessarily estab-
lishing general trade customs. See, for example, Ewart Grain Co v Wells-Abbott-Nieman
Co (NFGA 1920), reprinted in NGFA, Decisions of the Arbitrators and Appeals Committees
of the Grain Dealers National Association 316, 317 (1920) ("[Tlhe rules of various ex-
changes, which permit second inspection and discount based thereon, are not an expres-
sion of general trade customs and are applicable only at markets which carry them in
their rules."). The differences in the rules of local markets persisted even after the prom-
ulgation of the national rules, despite numerous efforts of the national association to pro-
mote uniformity. Effort to Unify Exchange Trade Rules Revived, 13 WWGT 27 (Dec 20,
1923-24). Some of these differences were attributed mostly to local dealers attempting to
gain advantage. Are the Association's Trade Rules in Danger?, 13 WWGT 28, 29 (Feb 20,
1923-24) ("It is safe to say that in the local rules governing the different boards of trade
there is unnecessary protection for the local members."). However, differences also existed
over unifying practices with no distributional impact. See notes 50 and 74. Conflicts over
whether a particular region's rules and customs should govern a particular transaction
were not uncommon sources of disagreement between transactors in different localities.
See, for example, Trade Rules: Chairman Replies, 13 WWGT 39, 41 (July 5, 1923-24)
("While it is true, as you state, that the general custom in your market is to buy on arrival
drafts, it is also customary in the western markets to make all sales subject to demand
drafts unless otherwise specified. Therefore, if the seller in this case was not familiar with
the Richmond market and made the trade in good faith presuming that the Kansas City
custom of demand drafts was understood, it might raise a question as to whether there
was any contract at all as there would be no agreement or meeting of the minds on this
term of the contract."). In addition, the differences in local rules, and the unwillingness of
local markets, associations, and exchanges to change their practices even as to aspects of
trade that had no clear distributional impact, were a frequent subject of trade press col-
umns. See, for example, Trade Rules: The Chairman Replies, 17 WWGT 31, 33 (Jan 5,
1927-28) ("[Ulniformity in the rules is a matter of slow growth as the different markets
are very conservative in making changes in rules of years standing."). See also sources
cited in note 50.
See, for example, Minutes of Meetings: Secretary's Book (no page number) (Nov 9,
1896) ("Secretary's Book") (unpublished book of clippings; copies on file with author) (re-
porting that the Illinois Grain Dealers' Association created trade rules, to, among other
things, "establish and maintain uniformity in commercial usages as far as the grain trade
is concerned").
Gordon, A Century of Agricultural Abundance at 51 (cited in note 56). See also The
President's Address, in Secretary's Book at 117-18 (cited in note 59) (Peavy Address)
("Trade rules and custom will be an interesting subject and will help to enlighten us in re-
gard to some of the ambiguous rules and customs now in vogue.").
" Gordon, A Century of Agricultural Abundance at 49 (cited in note 56). In addition, as
an early trade publication explained, "the farther the buyer is from the seller, the more
the need of a careful and distinct understanding, for reasons well known" Secretary's Book
at 111 (cited in note 59). Even today, in the Texas Feed Trade, transactors pay "much
more attention to contract when you deal with those in other areas." Statement of Pre-
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As the situation now is, there are customs in the grain trade
that are supposed to be established, but the trouble in re-
spect to them is, they are not fixed, are not understood alike,
some understand them in one way and others in another
way, and for that reason, if for no other [they] cause diffi-
culty.6
2
In response, in part, to this uncertainty, a Grain Trade Rules
Committee was appointed. In 1901 it submitted fourteen recom-
mendations relating to trade practices that it hoped would "do
much to bring about a more uniform custom, eliminate friction
and foster a better understanding and closer relations between
the interior dealer at primary or intermediate markets."' After
submitting these recommendations, the committee sought addi-
tional time to draft a complete set of rules, explaining that the
"wide area to be covered and the diverse interests to be equally
represented" made its task difficult. It asked the state associa-
tions and local exchanges to "formulate their trade customs into a
set of rules governing the transactions,"' so that the national
committee would have a basis from which to work.
The first set of grain rules was quite detailed. However, some
aspects of trade were not covered because customs differed sig-
nificantly across the country and consensus could not be
achieved. As one trade journal column noted:
I regret that it is not possible to give you a definite rule cov-
ering the case. The Grain and Feed Dealers National Asso-
ciation for two or three years endeavored to frame a rule
which would cover a condition of this nature, but we found
that the customs vary so largely in different sections of the
country and so many technical questions arose that it was
impossible to reach an agreement that would be national in
scope.'
senter, TGFA Conference (1999).
Secretary's Book (no page number) (cited in note 59).
Gordon, A Century of Agricultural Abundance at 50 (cited in note 56). These recom-
mendations dealt with confirmations, time for shipment, billing instructions, shipment,
demurrage, sample sale, loading, terms, telegram, acceptances, surplus shipments, regu-
lar market terms, interior shipments, and invoices. Secretary's Book (cited in note 59).
Gordon, A Century of Agricultural Abundance at 51 (cited in note 56).
Chairman Replies, 20 WWGT 31 (Oct 5, 1930-31). See also Chairman Replies, 21
WWGT 28 (Dec 5, 1931-32) ("[T]he rules of the Grain and Feed Dealers National Associa-
tion cover the broad principles of trading and details might differ as to the rate of interest,
or the custom of charging to a certain date, in different sections of the country, so we have
not attempted to formulate a rule on this point."); Hankerson Proposes Change in the
Trade Rules, 14 WWGT 27 (July 5, 1927-28) ("[W]hile a rule [regarding diversion dates]
has been suggested several times, none has been adopted, because it has been impossible
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When the first set of rules was finally introduced, merchants
had many questions about how to interpret them. In response,
the Association solicited "Ask the Chairman" letters from mem-
bers and published detailed answers in the Association's trade
journal. These columns reveal that an inability to agree on the
content of custom was not only a reason for certain gaps in the
trade rules, but was also a common cause of disagreement among
transactors.
Even after the NGFA adopted Trade Rules, large variations
in the written rules of local associations continued to exist.6 7 As
the Chairman of the Trade Rules Committee explained in 1928,
achieving "uniformity in the rules is a matter of slow growth as
the different markets are very conservative in making changes in
rules of years standing."'
The grain trade press also confirms that prior to codification
there was no agreement concerning the meaning of many basic
contractual terms. For example, the meaning of the term "car-
load" led to numerous controversies69 and questions from industry
members.7" Finally, it was suggested that grain should simply be
sold by weight and the designation "carload" abandoned.71 Even-
to frame a rule that would meet all conditions or would state the general principle that
would govern all transactions. It follows that each case would be settled on its merits with
due consideration to customs of the trade in specific territory.").
"These types of columns were common in the merchant trade press and typically con-
tained many inquiries about the content of custom. See, for example, National-American
Wholesale Lumber Association, Inc ("NAWLA"), Questions and Answers, North Coast
Weekly Letter No 150 (Nov 25, 1924) ("What is the custom in making final settlements
with mills when the wholesaler has purchased 'less 5% commission, underweights to mill
to final destination?'"); NAWLA, Questions and Answers, North Coast Weekly Letter
No 140 (Sept 16, 1924) ("Question: 'A wholesaler has taken a cash discount on a Final Set-
tlement sent to us four months after the date of shipment. Is he entitled to this discount
and what is the custom in regard to this?'"; "Question: 'Where order is accepted for '85%
10' and longer; balance shorter; usual lengths, well proportioned' what does 'well propor-
tioned' mean according to present customs?"). See also note 143 (discussing the question
and answer column in the silk industry journal, "The Silkworm").
' Are the Association's Trade Rules in Danger?, 13 WWGT 28-29 (Feb 20, 1923-24)
(extensively discussing differences in practices and rules from locality to locality).
Trade Rules: The Chairman Replies, 17 WWGT 31, 33 (Jan 5, 1927-28).
See, for example, Dispute Over Size of Cars: Smith Bros Grain Co v Security Mill
and Feed Co, 10 WWGT 28-29 (Oct 5, 1920-21) (the "claim in this case arises over the
question of the size of cars made applicable on a contract").
" See, for example, Replies of Chairman Watkins, 10 WWGT 38, 40 (Feb 20, 1920-21)
(answering what is meant by the term "capacity" car); Replies of Chairman Watkins, 10
WWGT 42 (Feb 5, 1920-21) (addressing the question what is meant by the "contents of one
80 capacity car"); Replies of Chairman Watkins, 11 WWGT 43 (Dec 5, 1921-22) (answering
the question "what constitutes a car load when a sale of grain is made without any refer-
ence being made as to the size of the cars").
" In a particular controversy there is reason to fabricate a dispute relating to the defi-
nition of a carload since the answer may have a key distributional impact. As one trade
article noted, if the market "has declined... you are liable to find 60,000 capacity cars.
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tually a rule was adopted defining carload in terms of weight, but
even after its adoption disputes continued to arise and the rule
was amended several times."2 There was also no consensus as to
the meaning of particular grades. 3
Unlike the Grain Trade Rules, the Feed Trade Rules did not
take long to draft once the codification effort began. However, the
need "for uniform rules" had been obvious for years. Prior to
adoption of the rules, trade practices varied widely: "The feed
men [] never had uniform rules to govern their transactions...
there were many sets of rules in different localities but there was
no uniformity." 4 Although "sporadic efforts were made from time
to time to achieve this most desirable object, 5 consensus could
not be achieved and the efforts to adopt written trade rules had
always failed. Finally, due to the efforts of a strong-willed man, a
Feed Trade Rules Committee was appointed. It met in intense
session for two days and came up with a draft set of rules. In re-
porting the work of his committee to the association as a whole,
the committee chairman did not attempt to give the rules legiti-
macy by claiming that they codified custom. Rather, he explicitly
acknowledged that they were the result of compromise, noting
that "[w]e succeeded in formulating rules that all of us agreed
upon as being the most equitable rules that it was possible to
draw up. We were in session two full days. Every point was
threshed out."' The fact that the feed rules were not based
strictly on custom, and that they were similar in many respects to
Should the market advance the cars furnished will be 30,000 capacity." Secretary's Book at
50 (cited in note 59).
See Trade Rules of the Grain Dealers National Association (1920), reprinted in 10
WWGT 39-40 (Nov 20, 1920-21) ("A carload shall consist of bushels as follows: Wheat
1,100; shelled corn, milo maize, kaffir corn, and feterita, 1,100; ear corn 700 .... Provided,
that where the rules of carriers lawfully on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission
or State Railway Commission provide for minimum carload weights in excess of the above,
such minimum weights shall constitute a carload within the meaning of this rule."); Trade
Rules, 17 WWGT 33-34 (Jan 5, 1927-28) (discussing a letter on the meaning of carloads).
See also Trade Rules Changes, 13 WWGT 38 (Oct 5, 1923-24) (discussing the amended
Rule 32 dealing with the definition of carloads).
See, for example, Secretary's Book at 54 (cited in note 59) ("ITihe grading of the dif-
ferent cereals in our markets in the United States vary so widely that it is almost impos-
sible to tell by the inspection at one market on any kind of grain, what the same class of
grain will grade in some of the other markets."); id at 63 ("We should discuss plans and
adopt measures which would lead to uniform grading.").
7' Trade Rules to Govern Transactions in Feedstuffs, 10 WWGT 25 (Apr 5, 1920-21).
When the feed rules committee was first appointed, it was directed to make "inquiry from
the various markets and for the sake of uniformity define what should constitute 'prompt,
quick, and immediate shipment.'" President Clement Makes Committee Appointment, 10
WWGT 25 (Nov 20, 1920-21).
" Trade Rules to Govern Transactions in Feedstuffs, 10 WWGT 25 (Apr 5, 1920-21).
76 Id (statement of E.C. Dreyer, Chairman of the Feed Committee).
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the grain rules, might account, in part, for the relatively short
amount of time it took to draft them.
Although the NGFA Rules Committee has met annually
since 1902 "to review the rules... [in an effort] to ensure that the
Trade Rules reflect-but do not set-industry trade practices," 7
most rule changes have in fact been attempts to clarify vague-
ness,78 respond to technological changes,79 change customs,' or to
simply adopt more desirable practices." Today, the Trade Rules
Committee is comfortable adopting and amending rules based
solely on their desirability and likely effect.2
C. Textile Industry
The debates surrounding the 1936 adoption of the Worth
Street Rules ("WSR")," which in modified form continue to govern
Gordon, A Century of Agricultural Abundance at 52 (cited in note 56). Since their in-
ception, the Grain Trade Rules have been amended fifty-eight times and the Feed Trade
Rules thirty-two times. Id.
" For example, the rules defining "business day/holiday" became more specific over
time.
" See Trade Rules and Arbitration Rules, 14 Grain Trade Rules R 45 ("Electronic Data
Interchange") (1995) (making the trade rules applicable to "trades that include electronic
transmission and receipt of data in agreed formats in substitution for conventional paper-
based documents").
See, for example, Grain Trade Rules Rule 29 (1922), reprinted in 12 WWGT 37 (Nov
20, 1921-22) ("The specifications of a contract cannot be altered or amended without the
expressed consent of both the buyer and the seller. This abolishes the custom of 'silence
confirms."). See also Hankerson Proposes a Change, 17 WWGT 27-28 (July 5, 1927-28)
("[W]e [the Trade Rules Committee] would like to get the reaction of the trade as to the
advisability of incorporating in the rules of the Association a rule which would be at vari-
ance with other customs in different parts of the country.").
"z See, for example, Proposed Changes in Association's Trade Rules, 11 WWGT 23
(Sept 20, 1921-22) (proposing "add[ing] to the present rule" a provision that "[any loss re-
sulting from irregular or incorrect invoices shall be paid for by the seller," and justifying it
on the grounds that "[tihe idea of the proposer of this change is that the invoice shall be
given more nearly the same dignity as the Bill of Lading to prevent losses due to careless
invoicing"); NGFA, Trade Rules and Contracts 7 (pamphlet, no date) ("The general objec-
tives of the Trade Rules Committee are ... [among other things] to formulate and recom-
mend to the membership, trading rules that will bring about improvement of marketing
procedures in the industry ... and enact new rules as needed to impartially govern trans-
actions.").
' This conclusion is based on my attendance at a meeting of the Committee (Washing-
ton, DC 1995).
' These rules were jointly adopted by the Textile Fabrics Association, Cotton-Textile
Institute, Fine Goods Committee of the Cotton-Textile Institute, International Association
of Garment Manufacturers, Union-Made Garment Manufacturers' Association, American
Cotton Manufacturers Association, National Association of Cotton Manufacturers, New
Bedford Cotton Manufacturers Association, Wholesale Dry Goods Institute, National As-
sociation of Purchasing Agents, Textile Brokers' Association, and Association of Cotton
Textile Merchants of New York. WSR 2 (1936). Before and during the rules creation proc-
ess, the textile industry was geographically concentrated "[iun a compact area of some six
blocks, located just north of City Hall Square in lower Manhattan," which contained the
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most textile transactions today,' together with other evidence
about the textile trade, suggest that that prior to codification,
both trade practices and the industry meaning of particular
terms varied widely.'
The idea of codifying textile industry customs, in an effort to
"improve trade practices, " ' was first raised at a 1918 meeting at
the Union League Club, where the idea "of devising a uniform
sales contract to simplify all market transactions" received strong
industry support.' Shortly thereafter, the Association of Cotton
Textile Merchants of New York ("ACTM") was formed, and it
made the adoption of trade rules a high priority, explaining that:
[Clontracts, to be sacred, must be sound. They must be based
upon fairness to buyer and seller alike; and this implies ac-
ceptance on all sides of standards of fair trade practice. Such
standards usually evolve from practical conditions as cus-
toms or unwritten laws, and men have tried perennially to
write them down, to codify them, so that disagreement and
"market for virtually all of the nation's output of cotton cloth." The Association of Cotton
Textile Merchants of New York, 25 Years 1 (Parker-Allston 1944) ("Textile Histor'). Al-
though industry members were drawn from many walks of life all over the country, they
developed a close-knit culture of their own. "[T]he first Worth Streeters were incureably
addicted to the stovepipe hat and frock coat, which continued to be the symbol of their
calling, and virtually their uniform, until the presidency of the first Roosevelt." The Worth
Street Story, 22 Am Fabrics 47, 48 (1952). Most merchants ate lunch at one of three eating
clubs, and the social ties they formed were so strong that most transactions were repeat
and "[e]very year millions of dollars worth of goods were sold without a paper that could
be taken to court in the case of a dispute. This unique and really wonderful method of
handling even the largest transactions still represents the philosophy behind the Worth
Street way of doing business." Id at 48-49.
" Jean E. Palmieri, Lawyers Group Publishes Revision of Worth Street Textile Market
Rules, 16 Daily News Rec 9 (Nov 12, 1986) ("The rules [WSRs] are commonly recognized
as the standard code of procedure and trade customs for the purchase, sale and use of tex-
tiles and allied products."). The WSRs were revised in 1941, 1947, 1964, 1971, and 1986.
The 1986 revision was undertaken by a group of textile lawyers whose goal was to simplify
the rules and make them more accessible. Id. The rules are incorporated into most textile
contracts, which also provide for arbitration under the Rules of the General Arbitration
Council of the Textile and Allied Trades, which are today administered by the American
Arbitration Association.
" See Note, Enforceable Arbitration of Commercial Disputes in the Textile Industries,
61 Yale L J 686, 711 n 147 (1952) ("Before the rules [WSRs], major disagreement was over
the inclusion of second quality cloth in each shipment, grace periods after delivery, and
the meaning of trade terms. In rayon, where there is virtually no agreement, conflict on
the meaning of trade custom is rife.... [In addition,] the definitions of imperfections re-
flect the manufacturer's interest that 'normal irregularities natural to the fibers used' ex-
ist and that 'a reasonable number of manufacturing defects must be expected. The stan-
dards leave 'normal irregularities' undefined.... There is basic disagreement on what
non-conformity is.").
Textile History at 37-38 (cited in note 83).
Id at 13-14.
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misunderstanding might be reduced to a reasonable mini-
num.
8
The process of drafting the WSRs was fraught with conflict, in-
volved negotiations among numerous trade associations, and pro-
ceeded slowly. The effort to draft a uniform sales note, which was
to become a key section of the WSRs, began in 1910. In 1920, six
proposed standard notes were recommended to ACTM members,
but as late as 1932 uniformity of practice had not been achieved. 9
In 1932, after two years of committee work devoted solely to that
subject, a standard set of eight Salesnote Clauses was finally
published.' In 1934 the first standard Cotton Textile Salesnote
was introduced. It was subsequently incorporated into the 1936
WSRs after an additional year of committee work.9'
Work on other aspects of the rules, such as the compilations
of usages in different branches of the trade, proceeded similarly
slowly. In 1928, for example, a committee was appointed "to begin
negotiations with representatives of the converters 'for the pur-
pose of defining some customs prevailing in the purchase and sale
of grey goods,"' 2 an effort that was not completed until 1931.
The 1936 WSRs, a culmination of eighteen years of concerted
effort on the part of industry participants, were an extraordinar-
ily detailed set of contract default rules. They covered many
stages of the manufacture and distribution of a variety of textile
products and defined numerous quality specifications, trade
terms, and trade customs for transactions in different types of
goods.93 Nevertheless, even after their adoption, substantial disa-
Id at 37-38.
Id at 40-41.
"Id at 40. See also Uniform Salesnote Clauses Recommended to Cotton Textile Trade,
Textile World 33 (Apr 6, 1932) (reprinting the Uniform Salesnote Clauses and a brief
statement in their support).
"Textile History at 41-42 (cited in note 83).
Id at 39.
The 1936 WSRs were thirty-nine pages long. They included a Standard Cotton Tex-
tile Salesnote, codifying customs and definitions dealing with allowances for deficiency,
arbitration, "as are," cancellation, rejections and claims, deliveries, general strike or lock-
out and normal production, goods not sold by description, latent defect, methods of testing
materials in dispute, packing, patent defect, quantities run of the loom or mill, seconds,
selection of representative pieces, selvage count, standard seconds and tailing clauses,
storage and insurance, strike or casualty, tailings, tape selvage and feeler motions, tensile
strength, and use-as well as special customs relating to the converting trade and what is
termed "pertinent data concerning the bag trade." WSR "Table of Contents" (1936). The
1941 and 1947 WSRs were seventy-one pages long. By 1964, the WSRs had expanded to
one hundred twenty-eight pages, and even after the 1986 revision, which was aimed at
simplification of the rules, they were still fifty-eight pages. Despite the extraordinary de-
tail of the WSRs, traders did not view them as providing the terms of a near complete con-
tingent-state contract. See Note, 61 Yale L J at 701 n 88 (cited in note 85) ("[I~t is quite
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greement over the trade meaning of even words that were them-
selves defined in the Rules persisted. For example, although the
1936 WSRs included definitions of the widely used designations
"first quality" and "seconds,"94 precisely the types of terms the
Code directs courts to look to usage to define,9 5 a 1949 National
Federation of Textiles Report on Association Activities contains a
discussion of attempts to compile "A Dictionary of Trade Expres-
sions":
What is meant by a 'piece of goods'? What does r.o.m. mean?
What is a 'second'? Does 'as are' include remnants? These
were questions asked so repeatedly during 1949, that at the
close of the year, plans were under way, to compile an official
list of trade expressions of this type.96
Similarly, a 1952 academic study of textile arbitration found
substantial disagreement among transactors as to the meaning of
these and other terms," concluding that in the industry as a
evident from interviews and questionnaires that the Worth Street Rules have many loop-
holes.... Many of the existing definitions are inadequate. For example, definitions of first
quality or run of the mill depend on a specific mill's records. These two terms are ex-
tremely variable .... Merchants also point to the failure of the rules to cover many issues
raised in disputes .... Specifically, textile men report that the rules overlook finished
goods and finishing qualities.... Correcting these deficiencies, however, is extremely dif-
ficult because textile disputes present an infinite number of variables.").
"Definitions and Trade Customs, WSR 32 (1936) ("The word 'Seconds' is applied to
cloth inferior to that which the subject mill grades as 'Standard' or 'first quality.'.. . Un-
fortunately, the grading of cloth does not lend itself to specific definition. Practice varies
with different mills and for different uses").
"See, for example, Foxco Industries, Ltd v Fabric World, Inc, 595 F2d 976, 984-85
(5th Cir 1979) (holding that in determining the meaning of "first quality" it is proper to
look to trade usages, since parties are "presumed to have intended the incorporation of
trade usage in striking their bargain").
"National Federation of Textiles, Inc, The National Federation of Textiles Reviews...
Activities. Officers. Members 71, 72 (1948, 1949, 1950). See also National Federation of
Textiles, Annual Report of National Federation of Textiles, Inc, 75th Annual Report 19
(1947) ("Coincident with suggestions for revision of the recommended contract [for rayon]
came repeated questions from buyers of grey goods as to the meaning of such phrases as
'run of the mill,' 'as are,' 'seconds,' etc. The cotton market had incorporated definitions of
such terms in their Worth Street Rules, but nothing comparable had been prepared for
rayon fabrics, despite the apparent general use of similar terms in that branch of the in-
dustry. It was thought this might be a subject of future determination through the Fed-
eration").
"See Note, 61 Yale L J at 691 & nn 26-27 (cited in note 85) (citations omitted):
Trade practice in classifying goods as first or second quality may facilitate buyer's ef-
forts to escape. These terms are not absolute; they are based on the particular plant's
past performance, a vague and shifting standard at best. * * * The difference between
first and second quality is not clear. By definition second quality goods are merchant-
able and reasonably free from major defects; yet they are inferior to and contain more
imperfections than first quality goods. The definition says no more. * * * In cottons
the standard [for first and second quality] not only varies from plant to plant but also
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whole, "trade custom... is often amorphous and unsettled." 8 In-
deed, the study found that lack of consensus on the meaning of
customs was one of the main reasons that transactors strongly
preferred three arbitrator panels to single arbitrator adjudication
in which the single arbitrator's idiosyncratic view of trade custom
would most likely be applied.'
Finally, the WSRs themselves posed a challenge to the Code
drafters' decision to accord written usages (in the form of trade
codes) and unwritten usages the same weight in adjudication.
The Forwards to various editions of the WSRs reveal that textile
merchants conceived of a hierarchy of trade customs. As the 1936
,WSR Forward stated, contingencies not covered by the standard
salesnote "shall be interpreted in accordance with the established
rules and customs of the trade, particularly with those rules and
customs which have been formally approved by authorized bod-
ies, representing both buyer and seller."" The WSRs themselves
separately listed customs that applied to the trade as a whole and
those that applied only to particular subdivisions. Moreover, the
1936 Forward cautioned that constant vigilance was needed to
ensure that rules and customs were reviewed periodically so that
"those [customs] that are determined to be entitled to recogni-
tion," could be "list[ed] in proper form."1°" Over time, the WSRs
from fabric to fabric.... Rayon finished goods are classified on an industry-wide
standard.... But rayon merchants assert that the standard is just as vague as that
used for cottons.
Id at 700.
Id at 712 n 152 ("Some converters state that the possibility of trade bias is so great
in the absence of agreement on trade custom that they will not go to arbitration."); id at
711 n 149 ("Many merchants stated expressly that one man [the arbitrator] might incor-
porate his trade bias in the fact-finding process."); id at 710 n 142 ("Textile men prefer
three man to one man arbitration" in part because it results in "a less arbitrary approach
to the issues," and "more expert knowledge [being] brought to bear on the case."); id at
698-99 & n 69 (noting the merchant's preferences for a three arbitrator structure); id at
711-12 (discussing how an arbitrator's status in the trade might affect his view of trade
custom).
"Forward, WSR 1 (1936). Although the quoted material seems to give unwritten cus-
tom some legitimacy, the Forward subsequently discusses the proper sources of authority
for arbitral decisionmaking, noting that "the Salesnote and Specifications nearly always
are considered together, but not everyone realizes ... that Trade Customs [as defined in
these rules] are the interpretations of them which should govern sellers and buyers in
their trading and which in turn, should guide arbitrators in their decisions." Id. The rules
give the Salesnote precedence over even written custom. WSR 23 (1960) ("In the case of
conflict, express or implied, between the Salesnote and the section on Definitions and
Trade Customs, the Salesnote governs."). Later WSRs forbid the arbitrators from looking
to anything other than the contract and written custom. Moreover, even when merchants
agree that something is indeed a customary practice, absent a contract clause requiring
that the practice be followed, they do not necessarily infer from the fact that something is
done that it should be done. See note 138.
"' Forward, WSR 1 (1936).
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themselves came to be recognized as custom 2 and the rules
themselves came to discourage recourse to unwritten custom. The
Standard Salesnote in the 1986 WSRs introduced a term provid-
ing that arbitrators "shall have no power to alter or in rendering
their award to depart from any express provision of this contract,
and their failure to observe this limitation shall constitute
grounds for vacating their award."'0°
More generally, the existence of comprehensive codified cus-
toms was considered an essential reason for'the success of textile
arbitration. As the 1952 study noted, "Lack of mutually accept-
able codes of trade custom in rayon has in large part been re-
sponsible for any dislike of rayon arbitration. Agreement on codi-
fied trade custom in cotton, on the other hand, has been a major
factor in the success of its arbitration.""° And, as a 1919 editorial
in Textile World Journal noted, "in the past, sellers, as well as
buyers ... have viewed with suspicion such [an arbitration] plan
for settling disputes. They have felt that competitors in their line
of business might not be in a position to give an unbiased decision
on matters involving usage in the trade with which they are con-
nected."105
D. Silk
The Silk Association of America ("SAA ) °s had one of the
earliest and most well-regarded arbitration systems.0 7 Like the
"See WSR 3 (1941) ("By common consent and almost universal usage, [the WSRs]
have come to be recognized as the standard code of procedure and trade custom applicable
to the purchase and sale of cotton textiles and allied lines.").
1-WSR 3 (1986).
'"Note, 61 Yale L J at 713 (cited in note 85).
"Advantages of Arbitration, Textile World J 30 (May 17, 1919). See also Legal Cancel-
lations, Textile World J 38 (Dec 18, 1920) ("At various times when the subject of a stan-
dard sales note has been considered, the need of such standards and tolerances has been
recognized, but with very few exceptions, none have been developed that could not be
punched full of holes by clever lawyers. The usual procedure when a case of this kind
comes before the court is for both the plaintiff and defendant to call as witnesses a number
of so-called authorities to testify regarding trade custom.").
"See American Arbitration Association, Year Book on Commercial Arbitration in the
United States, 1927 772 (Oxford 1927) ("The Silk Association of America, Inc., is a national
organization, established 'to promote the advancement and prosperity of the silk inter-
ests. [Its members include] raw silk importers, dealers and brokers, commission throw-
sters, manufacturers of swing silks and twists, broad silks, ribbons and hatbands, laces,
nets and veilings, knit goods and glove silks; skein dyers, piece dyers; printers and finish-
ers; manufacturers of silk machinery and supplies; manufacturers' agents and commission
merchants.").
'"Irving S. Paul, J.W. Millard, and James S. Taylor, Trade Association Activities 112
(Department of Commerce 1927) (describing and lauding the operation of the SAA arbitra-
tion tribunal); I.L. Blunt, American Commercial Arbitration, 3 Arbitration J 299 (1939)
(describing the SAA as an arbitration "pioneer").
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textile system, it governed transactions among merchants who
played fixed roles in the chain of production and distribution of
silk. The arbitration system was created in 1898,108 but trade
rules were not adopted until several years later. The SAA By-
Laws noted that the Association aimed, among other things, to
"establish and maintain uniformity and certainty in the customs
and commercial usages of the silk trade,""° and early reports
noted that "committees of the Association are intelligently and
constantly... seeking to improve trade usages, and to substitute
better methods as between buyers and sellers."'10
The rules creation process at the SAA was even more conten-
tious and drawn out than in other associations."' For example,
work on the Trade Rules for Raw Silk began in 1901,112 but after
"two years of fruitless discussion of the rules proposed, the com-
mittee was discharged at the request of its own chairman.""3 As
an Association report explained, "The get-together spirit was not
sufficiently pronounced to override the differences that arose
when the rules in detail were considered."" Work on the rules
resumed in 1907, and new rules were adopted in 1908, after four-
teen separate committee meetings, "several conferences between
the Raw Silk Division ... and the Board of Managers" 15 to ad-
dress "difficulties," and the "approval of some amendments.""' In
approving the rules, the Board of Managers emphasized, as did
the preambles to the rules themselves, that they were merely de-
fault rules.17
"'Blunt, 3 Arbitration J at 300 (cited in note 107). The SAA also sponsored an Exami-
nation Bureau to make quality determinations and an Adjustment Bureau that offered in-
formal mediation services.
"'By-Laws of the SAA Art 11, § 1, in SAA, Forty-First Annual Report 12 (1913).
"I SAA, Thirty-First Annual Report 28 (1903).
' One reason for the unusual level of tension may have been that buyers associations
negotiated with sellers associations so that the distributive impact of the outcomes
reached might, along many dimensions, have been quite serious.
"'Efficient Distribution an Aid to Industry, 6 Silkworm 365, 367 (Feb 1925).
" SAA, Thirty-Fifth Annual Report 23 (1907).
"'Id.
"'SAA, Thirty-Sixth Annual Report 35-36 (1908).
..Id at 36. These Rules were amended in 1912, SAA, Fortieth Annual Report 31
(1912), in 1921 alter "a year of careful study on the part of the committee," Revision, 3
Silkworm 73 (May 1921), and again in 1924 after the "culmination of many months of in-
tensive effort on the part of a committee of representative buyers and sellers to revise the
rules in such a way as to cover changes in trade customs which had developed since...
1921," including changes in credit terms and "provisions for claim, rejections and replace-
ments which were rephrased so as to conform with customs which had developed in the
trade and to cover those points which had not, perhaps, been clearly understood.& " SAA,
Fifty-Third Annual Report 26 (1925).
SAA, Thirty-Sixth Annual Report 83 (1908); Raw Silk Rules and Regulations, in id
at 77 ("[N]othing in the following rules shall be construed as waiving the right in individ-
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The creation of the Silk Throwsters Rules"8 in 1907 after a
year of "active group work""9 was also contentious,"2 but pro-
ceeded relatively quickly, perhaps because the group adopted
"practically the same rules which obtain in Europe." 2' The goal of
the codification movement was to get "business conditions on a
more uniform basis and [formulate] a standard set of trade rules,
which would be acceptable to both manufacturer and throw-
ster."1
22
The creation of Rules for Thrown Silk was also a controver-
sial process. After several years of committee work, the first draft
of the rules was proposed in 1923, but rejected by the Association.
This raised the ire of their author, who stormed:
The Thrown Silk Division of the Association has been at
work with a committee appointed by the Association for a
number of months past on rules to regulate the sale of
thrown silk in all its branches, and after a great deal of time
and labor, their recommendations were submitted to the
Board of Managers of the Association. These recommenda-
tions were based on current market practice, and it is to be
regretted that the Board did not see fit to accept them as
ual transactions to make any special or distinct contrary agreement, but that the rules
shall govern only in cases where no special or specific contract exists.").
... These rules were quite detailed. They defined acceptable tolerances, manufacturing
techniques, various allocations of liability, payment, and transport. They also noted that
"the amount of loss to be allowed in the actual working of a given silk (to be arrived at as
above stated) is universally a matter of agreement between the manufacturer and the
throwster." Id at 32.
"Trade Practices, 2 Silkworm 28 (Feb 1921).
'"The creation of other sets of rules was somewhat less contentious. The Rules Gov-
erning Broad Silks, "which embody the best sentiments of prominent manufactures in this
leading branch of the industry," were drafted in 1912-13. SAA, Forty-First Annual Report
45 (1913). The effort to adopt them, however, began in 1907 and "was continued intermit-
tently for a number of years until, by virtue of the most dogged efforts and persistency, a
set of trade practices was adopted and approved." Trade Practices, 2 Silkworm 28 (Feb
1921). The Rules Governing Spun Silk were drafted during 1921-22 and adopted in 1923
with little fanfare. SAA, Fifty-First Annual Report 56 (1923). They were amended in 1928
in a process described as "translating customary trade practice into uniform trade rules."
SAA, Fifty-Sixth Annual Report 16 (1928). In addition, "Rules Governing the Commission
Throwing of Silk" were adopted in 1927 as part of a renewed attempt to achieve "ad-
vancement in the standardization of trade practices through the adoption of rules and
forms." SAA, 55th Annual Report 17 (1927). During 1927, a wide variety of standard form
contracts were adopted. SAA, Fifty-Sixth Annual Report 17-25 (1928).
"'SAA, Thirty-Sixth Annual Report 53 (1908).
1 SAA, Thirty-Fifth Annual Report 55 (1907). See also SAA, Thirty-Sixth Annual Re-
port 30 (1908) (amending the Throwsters Rules to include a "standard weight" provision to
eliminate "the former uncertainty and divergence in the kind of weight charged for by
throwsters").
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submitted, and thus place an important branch of the silk
industry on a sound economic basis."m
The rules were eventually adopted in 1924, "the result of four
years' endeavor to compile the list of best trade practices ...
based on suggestions and experiences from both buyers and sell-
ers,"124 and were said to 'Till a long felt need."" In the late 1920s
the Association also began to promulgate standard form contracts
in an effort to bring about even greater uniformity in trading
terms. The various rules adopted by the SAA were amended nu-
merous times during the 1920s and 1930s, ostensibly to respond
to changes in trade practices."
The contentiousness surrounding the adoption of silk trade
rules is in some respects surprising. There was much more
agreement about the content of existing practices than in other
industries, perhaps because of the somewhat smaller number of
individuals engaged in the trade. However, unlike merchants in
many industries who often venerated existing practices, silk
transactors frequently criticized existing practices as being out of
date, inefficient, or just plain stupid." Like the grain dealers,
.. SAA, Fifty-First Annual Report 55 (1923)."
'"SAA, Fifty-Second Annual Report 23 (1924).
1
wId.
1
"See notes 120 and 122; SAA, 57th Annual Report 22 (1929) ("Both revisions of fin-
ished goods rules and compilation of raw goods rules have been based on market practices
and customs, generally accepted in the silk industry."). Some of the changes introduced in
the 1930s might have been responses to the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 ch
90, 48 Stat 195 (1933), codified at 15 USC §§ 701-12 (1994), terminated by Exec Order No
7252 (Dec 21, 1935), and government initiatives related to it, which among other things,
encouraged trade associations to adopt rules known as codes of fair competition. See gen-
erally Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism
and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 Albany L Rev 325, 370 (1995) (discuss-
ing the influence of the NIRA on trade association activities).
" SAA, Thirty-Fifth Annual Report 57 (1907) ("[W]hy this stupid custom [of 'another
bill and the old price'] should continue, no satisfactory explanation can be given. There is
no more reason for this, than for the equally foolish custom that prevailed for many years
in giving the jobber 'protection in case of a decline in price.'"); SAA, XLIIIAnnual Report
41 (1915) (noting that tie silk manufacturers would be better off if it were "possible to in-
duce the trade to break away from their fixed traditions") (emphasis added). See also SAA,
Third Annual Report 64-65 (1875) ("It is strange how far custom will lead us, when our
better judgment would not go a step. This may be especially the case, in regard to the cus-
tom of charging single ounces on a bale of silk. Not a merchant, not a manufacturer, not a
throwster, but knows that silk is very sensitive of atmospheric changes, that bale will vary
by weight a few ounces if weighted twice in one day, and yet they all sanction this custom
by tacitly conforming to it without objection."); Ribbons Report, in SAA, Forty-Fourth An-
nual Report 65 (1916) (harshly condemning the practice of the "the open order, with no
definite date of assortment," attributing the practice to "the custom of the trade, as consti-
tuted at present [which] did not compel [buyers] to assort the goods until they were
needed, which might be at any future time, if at all"); SAA, XX Annual Report 38 (1903)
("It has often been noted that it is the custom with most manufacturers to continue their
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they lamented the difficulty of changing existing practices. As one
SAA banquet speaker put it, "Huge question marks are boldly
scribed on the walls of custom, hoary with age, and covered with
the ivy of reverence and toleration.""' Similarly, as the 1918 An-
nual Report noted:
Modifications of trade customs are exceedingly difficult to in-
troduce. Trade practices are handed on from generation to
generation of office administrators and when a business rou-
tine is established in an organization it often requires a re-
organization, a so-called 'shake-up,' to introduce innovations.
Considering this conservatism the [success of the SAA in
modifying practices] may be looked upon justly as a real ac-
complishment of the Association."
The hostility toward custom in this industry might have been
due, at least in part, to the fact that many customs were per-
ceived to be, and might well have been, "customs of adhesion," or
attempts of particular branches of the industry to secure competi-
tive advantage.
Although customs in the silk industry were better estab-
lished than customs in other industries, there was still much
disagreement about the meaning of basic trade terms. For exam-
ple, at the 1915 SAA Convention, one speaker pointed out that
there was no common understanding of the term "Double Extra"
silk:
There is not a man here who could give a definition. Some of
you men, however, can tell us what No. I Buckwheat coal is,
and for the simple reason you have a standard to go by, and
certain tests that No. I Buckwheat must live up to. When we
have a standard for Double Extra silk, and certain tests that
a Double Extra must meet, then will you be able to define a
Double Extra. The present Double Extra silk is any one
man's opinion."
output for the Fall consumption on the same basis as the Spring, when it is known, with-
out contradiction, that the demand for the last part of the year is much less than for the
first half.).
'"SAA, XLII Annual Report 145 (1914). See also SAA, Thirty-Sixth Annual Report 21-
22 (1908) ("The silk interests have come to one absolute conclusion, and that is that all
past methods that have not proven sound and reliable need to be revised?).
" SAA, 46th Annual Report 82 (1918). See also SAA, Forty-Fourth Annual Report 57-
58 (1916) (where the Tie Silk Association boasted that progress had been made in achiev-
ing change in the face of powerful customs, noting that "[w]hat had been hitherto consid-
ered impossible for the neckware trade, that is to pay more than 80 to 82 1/2 cents for
their 50 cent line, was accomplished. Old traditions were brushed aside").
""Proceedings of the First National Silk Convention 136 (1915) ("First Silk Conven-
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In addition, numerous other practices, particularly those relating
to grade designations, were quite varied in different geographic
areas.
3 1
E. Methodological Problems
A serious difficulty raised by drawing on the trade associa-
tion codification debates to explore whether industry-wide, un-
written customs existed is that the data is also consistent with
the possibility that industry-wide customs did exist, but that the
codification debates provided an opportunity for rent-seeking
subgroups to fabricate disputes about the content of custom3 2 and
tion"). More notably, in 1923 a Committee of the British Silk Association wrote a report
attempting to define the word silk. See Proper Use of the Word "Silk" Defined by Commit-
tee of British Association, 5 Silkworm 176 (July 1923) ("Silk means the natural product of
the silkworm, whether Net Silk or Spun Silk" and should not, with the exception of
"[c]ertain smallwares containing Silk in combination with other fibres ... [that] have been
by long established custom known as Silks," be "used for combined fabric products.").
"'See, for example, First Silk Convention at 119 (cited in note 130) ("There exists in
raw silks a Japan, Italian, China, French, Turkish and Canton classifications, which are
all unlike.... Taking everything into consideration, the six classifications have no resem-
blance to each other at all."); James Chittick, Silk Manufacturing and its Problems 25
(James Chittick 1913) ("Yokohama classifications do not correspond with those of New
York, the No. 1 of Japan being called here Best No. 1."). Moreover, the way quality desig-
nations were defined tended to change from year to year as crop conditions changed. See,
for example, First Silk Convention at 119 (attributing the "fluctuation of classifications" to
the fact that "after a rainy season, when all the qualities of silk are poorer, the same clas-
sifications are retained so that an Extra in 1915 is different quality from an Extra in
1914"). This type of variation would create significant problems for a court applying the
Code because cases typically go to trial several years after a dispute arises, so recon-
structing the content of time-dependent industry customs of this type would be quite diffi-
cult.
n Conversely, statements that custom exists must also be interpreted cautiously. The
Report of the 1909 convention of the NHA, for example, contains a discussion in which one
transactor asserted the existence of a custom relating to a shipment term and another
member nonetheless suggested that they "write it out." NHA, Report of the Sixteenth An-
nual Convention 216 (1909). As they attempted to formulate a rule on the matter they
tried to answer a series of hypotheticals until it became clear that the proponent of the
custom could not defend it as providing the relevant answers. Id at 216-17. Similarly, at
the 1999 Texas Grain and Feed Association conference, a speaker on the arbitration proc-
ess noted, "it turns out [with respect to customs of the trade that] people who think they
agreed have very different ideas when it is applied to specific cases."
It is also possible that, to the extent that participants in the codification debates re-
ceived prestige or improved business contacts from actively participating in the commit-
tees of the national trade association in their industry, they may have had an incentive to
exaggerate the lack of uniformity in trade practices in order to enhance the perceived im-
portance of the association and its codification efforts. Although this explanation might
account for some of the statements made by high-ranking association founders in the early
years, it is unlikely to be a complete explanation. The codification of trade rules was con-
sidered an important association functioni. However, the formation of national associations
was largely motivated by, and derived its prestige from, associations' efforts to lobby the
federal government for railroad tariff reductions, agricultural subsidies, and a uniform bill
of lading law. In addition, many codification debate participants had very different incen-
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to lobby for the recognition of the trade practices most favorable
to them.' It is difficult to negate this possibility entirely."M How-
ever, even if rent seeking does account for the lack of consensus
as to the content of some trade practices in certain industries, it
is unlikely to account for all or even most incidences of disagree-
ment." In addition, because all industry trade rules are default
provisions that can be varied by contract, and because in many
industries proposed rules had to be approved by the membership
at large, with each firm getting one vote regardless of its size, the
amount of rent that a group could capture through the rules crea-
tion process, relative to the rent it could capture through the con-
tracting process and/or the custom creation process, is not so
large.3
There are a number of additional reasons why rent seeking is
unlikely to account for most disagreement about the content of
customary practices. First, in industries that were composed of
numerous local associations and exchanges before the formation
of a national association, the written rules adopted by these small
associations and exchanges differed widely. This gives some as-
surance that the debates relating to differences in customary
practices reflected at least some real differences in the way that
tives from association executives. For example, much of the impetus for uniform written
rules came from merchant arbitrators confronted with the need to decide cases. The pres-
tige of the title "arbitrator" and the perceived legitimacy of these tribunals depended on
the arbitrators resting their decisions on reasons that industry members would regard as
proper, yet the arbitrators consistently lamented in their opinions and annual committee
reports the lack of uniform customs that could be used to resolve disputes. Although it
might be argued that this gave them an incentive to lobby for the adoption of rules, the
position of arbitrator generally lasted only for a year or two, so it is unlikely that they
would have an incentive to undermine the legitimacy of the tribunal today for a benefit
that would accrue, if at all, only to those appointed to decide cases in the future.
'"Indeed, in some industries, such as silk, this might have been a significant cause of
disagreement. However, even if rent seeking did account for much of the disagreement
over the content of customs, the existence of such disagreements would have serious con-
sequences for the incorporation strategy. If rent-seeking attempts could not be distin-
guished from genuine differences in practice at association hearings, it is highly unlikely
that an arbitration panel or court could make such a distinction in an actual case where
the parties would also have strong financial incentives to lie.
"The actual opportunity to rent seek likely varied widely across industries due to dif-
ferences in their voting rules, committee structures, and committee compositions (elected
or appointed), as well as the order of their annual meeting agendas.
" In addition, if rent seeking was part of the process of codifying national rules, it
might also have been part of the local rules creation process and the process of custom
capture. It is therefore yet another force that works against rather than for the emergence
of strong-form, pure Hayekian customs. See notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
"'Some trade rules had to be separately approved by buyers and sellers associations.
See, for example, ATMI and ACSA, Southern Mill Rules at 32 (cited in note 27). The WSRs
were also separately approved by groups of buyers and sellers. See WSR 2 (1936) (listing
sponsoring organizations).
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business was done in different parts of the country, rather than
mere fabricated differences between rent-seeking industry sub-
groups. Second, the 1952 textile study found widespread disa-
greements over the meaning of usages of trade in a context where
neither amending the rules nor deciding an actual case was at
stake.'37 The existence of similar disagreements in other indus-
tries such as grain, lumber, and silk are confirmed by articles in
their trade press and/or similar surveys." Third, many of the
codification efforts were motivated by a perceived need to make
customs more uniform if misunderstandings were to be avoided
and arbitration was to become an effective way to resolve dis-
putes. If, however, the geographical scope of customs was coex-
tensive with the geographical scope of efficient trade, and if these
customs were, in fact, generally known and implicitly assented to,
codification should not have been necessary to achieve predict-
able arbitral outcomes and avoid commercial misunderstand-
ing.139 Fourth, contemporary interview evidence from the feed
" See Note, 61 Yale L J at 700 (cited in note 85).
"For example, lumber associations conducted and published a number of surveys of
trade practices that were not in any way related to the rules creation or amendment proc-
esses. These surveys found that industry members did not generally agree on the content
of business practices. See, for example, NAWLA, Adjusting Salesmen's Commissions,
North Coast Weekly Letter No 192 (Sept 29, 1925) (reporting the results of a fifty person
survey asking, "Where a commission salesman is paid so much per M on his sales and the
customer claims a shortage of say, a few thousand feet, is it common practice to deduct the
amount of the commission to be paid the salesman where an allowance is made covering
such a shortage? Where a commission man is paid on a percentage basis, say five percent,
and a claim for any reason allowed to customer, is a deduction, based on the allowance,
made from commission paid?" and noting that "[tihe majority (35) state they do not think
it is customary or good business policy to revise the commission where shortages or grade
complaints develop.... Fifteen members stated they believed the salesman should stand
his pro-rata of the deduction in both cases.... The majority who answered the second
question stated that where salesman is working on a percentage of the profits, the sales-
man should stand his share of any losses!; also reporting six statements of respondents
setting out further nuances); NAWLA, Who Collects Rate Overcharges?, North Coast
Weekly Letter No 193 (Oct 6, 1925) (noting similar divergence of opinion, correlated with
the size of the firm, to the question: "When stock is bought f.o.b. mill basis on guaranteed
weight, and the transportation company makes an overcharge in rate, is it up to the buyer
to collect from the railroad, or should he charge the mill and let the mill collect claim?").
See also note 223 (discussing silk surveys).
"If the type of consensus about and widespread knowledge of the content of trade us-
ages that is assumed by the Code is thought to consistently emerge in mercantile contexts,
it is necessary to explain why, from at least the middle ages to the present, there have
been so many attempts to codify mercantile customs. Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous
Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S Econ J 644, 649 (1989) ("[Als the norms of [medieval
merchant] commercial law became more precisely specified they were increasingly re-
corded .... not [in] statutory codes .... [but in] written commercial instruments and con-
tracts."); Gerard Malynes, I Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria: or the Ancient Law-Merchant
a, a2 ("To the Courteous Reader") (T. Baffet 1685, repr Professional Books 1981) (compil-
ing, in meticulous detail, trade practices and laws "[flor the maintenance of Traffick and
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trade in Texas suggests that even within the state, trade prac-
tices regarding core contractual terms vary widely. 4 ' Fifth, at as-
Commerce [which] is so pleasant, amiable and acceptable unto all Princes and Potentates,
that Kings have been and at this day are of the Society of Merchants: And many times,
notwithstanding their particular differences and quarrels, they do nevertheless agree in
this course of Trade .... Whereupon I have been moved, by long observation, to put the
worthiness of the Customary Law of Merchants, in plain and compendious writing, by un-
doubted principles, familiar examples and demonstrative reasons"); A Member of the Mas-
sachusetts Bar, The Business Guide and Legal Companion 59, 60 (1845) (defining, like
many commercial dictionaries, words like "hogshead," "barley corns," and "penny-
weights"); J.R. McCulloch, 2 A Dictionary, Practical, Theoretical, and Historical, of Com-
merce and Commercial Navigation 720, 724 (Henry Vethake, ed) (Thomas Wardle 1841)
(providing tables of weights and measures, and defining words and recording customs
such as the custom "of allowing more than 16 ounces to the pound of butter [which] used
to be very general in several parts of the country").
Today, the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), a major provider of interna-
tional arbitration services, has promulgated several quasi-official codifications of customs.
One of the most important is the Incoterms, "a set of international rules for the interpre-
tation of the chief terms used in foreign trade contracts, for the optimal use of business-
men who prefer the certainty of uniform international rules." ICC, Incoterms: Interna-
tional rules for the interpretation of trade terms 6 (ICC 1980). These rules acknowledge the
undesirability of interpreting agreements by reference to custom, explaining that "[elvery
endeavour has been made to limit such references to custom to the absolute minimum." Id
at 8. However, noting that it has been "impossible to avoid [references to custom] alto-
gether," the rules advise "the seller and the buyer.., to keep such general and particular
customs in mind when negotiating their contract." Id. The Incoterms implicitly recognize
that customs may be highly local in nature by including a default choice-of-custom provi-
sion, which provides that customary matters are to be "decided by the custom of the par-
ticular trade or port." Id. To further reduce uncertainty, the ICC has published several
more particularized compilations of customs. See, for example, ICC, Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits, ICC Pub No 500 (1993); ICC, Uniform Rules for Collec-
tions, ICC Pub No 522 (1995); ICC, Uniform Rules for Contract Guarantees, ICC Pub No
325 (1978).
However, it is important not to attach too much weight to the possibility that the per-
ceived need to write customs down suggests that customs are not sufficiently definite or
uniform. There are a variety of other reasons, particularly in the trade association context,
that the codification of custom might have been undertaken. First, when the relatively
new national associations decided to adopt rules, they may have enhanced the legitimacy
of the rules and reduced suspicion about the drafters' motivations by claiming that these
rules were mere codifications of existing practices. Second, because most trade association
arbitrators were industry participants, codification might have been viewed as useful for
constraining some types of arbitral bias or making such bias easier to detect, thereby re-
ducing arbitral discretion and enhancing the legitimacy and perceived fairness of the tri-
bunals. Maintaining the tribunals' appearance of fairness was especially important prior
to 1920, when both ex ante agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards were legally un-
enforceable. Third, because most arbitrators were not lawyers, codified rules enabled them
to decide cases without having to familiarize themselves with the intricacies of sales law.
Fourth, codification might have been viewed as necessary because, as the pace of techno-
logical and market changes increased, practices needed to change more quickly and in
more coordinated ways than was possible through the slow accretion of custom. Finally,
associations might have desired quality standardization and uniformity of trade practice
because they can facilitate anticompetitive behavior.
1
'Interview with TGFA executive (1998) (on file with author); Interview with TGFA
Board Member (1998) (on file with author); Discussant at TGFA Meeting (Feb 18, 1999)
(explaining that the TGFA "Rules Committee didn't add certain truck rules because there
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sociations like the NHA, where proposed rules were subject to
floor debate at the Association's annual convention,' and de-
bates were reported verbatim in the Association's Annual Report,
there were publicity-based reputational constraints on debate
participants. A transactor who suggested something was a cus-
tom when it was not risked reputational harm. If, for example,
there was a custom that it was reasonable to take ten days to in-
spect goods before rejecting them, and a buyer stood up at the
convention and said that it was reasonable to take twenty days,
sellers would be wary of dealing with him in the future.' If,
however, the buyer could be sure that all other buyers would get
up immediately and say twenty days, he might well engage in
this type of distributional bargaining. In industries like silk,
where the rules were the outcome of bargaining among groups of
buyers and sellers who each deliberated in secret and then held a
meeting between designated representatives of each group to ne-
gotiate the final rules, reputational constraints would have been
much weaker, and the silk debates do indeed contain many in-
stances of what might have been rent-seeking behavior. Sixth,
some of the terms about whose meaning transactors disagreed
have no distributive impact. For example, outside of the context
of a specific dispute, a decision on how many days are meant by
the terms "prompt" or "quick" does not have distributional impli-
cations, because most trade rules contained a menu of time des-
ignations to choose from. Seventh, in industries whose trade
journals had columns where members could pose hypothetical
questions to association executives, members often asked "what is
the custom with regard to X"' 43
Finally, the testimony of representatives of the Commerce
and Industry Association,' a trade organization of merchants, in
the hearings on the proposed Code provides support for the no-
were many different customs," but noting that this was "okay because trucks tend to
travel in a 150 mile radius and people know how things are done in their area").
..In the early days of national trade associations, one of the main purposes of the an-
nual convention was to form relationships and learn about the reputations of transactors
in other localities. As a consequence, transactors attending these meetings were quite con-
scious of guarding their reputations.
" Similarly, in the grain industry where many merchants were buyers one day and
sellers the next, they would have had no reason to skew the rules toward buyers or sellers.
" See, for example, Questions and Answers, 8 Silkworm 300 (Dec 1926) ("Is it custom-
ary to include in a contract with commission weavers a clause to the effect that the house
must use only such quantities of yarns as are in accordance with the standards and rules
of the Association."); Questions and Answers, 8 Silkworm 240 (Oct 1926) ("A piece goods
manufacturer inquires if it is customary in the trade for the manufacturer to return the
caps to the throwster.").
'" Formerly the Merchants Association of New York.
[66:710
Questionable Empirical Basis
tion that customs did not exist and reveals that merchants were
consciously aware of, and opposed to, the Code's incorporation
strategy. The opinions they expressed were remarkably consis-
tent with the arguments made during the intra-association codi-
fication debates, most of which had taken place many years ear-
lier. For example, the Association's representatives objected to in-
cluding "observance of reasonable commercial standards" in the
Code's good faith provision, 45 explaining that "the usages, cus-
toms and practices of business are far from being uniform, and
the determination of whether a merchant has conformed to rea-
sonable commercial standards would be difficult and would pro-
duce excessive litigation."'46 A similar position was taken by the
'-UCC § 1-203 & cmt.
'"Commerce and Industry Association of New York, Inc ("CIANY"), Memorandum of
Task Group of the Special Committee of the Commerce and Industry Association of New
York, on the Uniform Commercial Code on Article 2, Sales and Article 6, Bulk Transfers, in
Study of UCC Memoranda 24, 29, reprinted in State of New York, 1 Report of the Law Re-
vision Commissioner for 1954 at 88-93 (cited in note 13). In addition, during the hearings,
Professor John 0. Honnold posed some questions to representatives of the Commerce and
Industry Association of New York in an attempt to see if proposed Code provisions con-
formed to trade understanding of particular terms. In most of their responses, association
representatives stated that practice was not "exactly uniform." For example, when asked
about the meaning of "F.O.B. vessel," a representative noted, "while it is trade under-
standing in certain fields that the buyer must arrange for steamer space.., in practical
operation buyers customarily depend upon the sellers to make arrangements and ship via
the most suitable and expeditious vessel available at the time the goods are ready for ex-
port." CIANY, Memorandum Replying to Questions Propounded by Professor Honnold at
Law Revision Commission Hearing I-D, in UCC Memoranda at 67, reprinted in State of
New York, 1 Report of the Law Revision Commissioner for 1954 at 131. In response to
questions about the meaning of other proposed terms, the merchants said:
there appears to be a diversity of opinion as to inspection right where the contract
terms are 'F.O.B. vessel' or 'F.A.S" While the view has been expressed in a particular
industry that the purchaser has the right to inspect goods before payment under such
terms, the general export practice apparently is that the buyer has no right of inspec-
tion before payment unless there is specific prior agreement that such inspection or
examination is required by the buyer. It is recommended practice that such prior
agreement also specify whose account is to be charged for the cost of such inspection
since such cost may be appreciable when the charges for inspection engineers, open-
ing and closing constraints, and making goods available for examination are consid-
ered.
Id.
The Association also objected to part of the proposed Code's cure provision that gives
the seller additional time to cure if he "had reasonable grounds to believe [the noncon-
forming tender] would be acceptable," UCC § 2-508(2), where the reasonableness of
grounds is determined, in part, by reference to "prior course of dealing, course of perform-
ance, or usage of trade," id at cmt 2. In its criticism of the provision, the Association ex-
plained, "There is no reason why a seller should ever believe that a non-conforming tender
would be acceptable to the buyer." CIANY, Memorandum of Task Group, in UCC Memo-
randa at 37, reprinted in State of New York, 1 Report of the Law Revision Commissioner
for 19,54 at 101.
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New York Law Revision Committee's Report on the Code.' Thus,
while Llewellyn justified the incorporation strategy on the
grounds that it would make merchant law more accommodating
to merchant concerns, the approach was not viewed in a positive
light by the very merchants whose transactions it was designed
to govern.
Conclusion
Although the evidence presented here has not conclusively
demonstrated that the types of usages of trade, commercial stan-
dards, and industry-specific meanings of terms, referenced in the
Code do not ever exist, it has suggested that the empirical foun-
dation on which the Code in general, and its incorporation strat-
egy in particular, is built may be weak. In addition, as the next
Part suggests, the lack of consensus on the content of customary
practices documented in the case studies is in no way surprising
since there are a number of reasons to suspect that uniform cus-
toms relating to many aspects of a transaction would not exist. As
a consequence, it is useful to reconsider the justifications for the
Code's incorporation strategy and to look briefly at the ways that
it has been invoked by parties and used by courts in decided
cases.
II. THE INCORPORATION STRATEGY REVISITED
Code drafters and later commentators justified the pervasive
incorporation strategy by noting that contracts are incomplete
because rationality is bounded; because the transaction and stra-
tegic costs of including provisions dealing with all contingencies,
particularly remote or unforeseen contingencies, are high; and
' The New York Law Revision Commission
was a little dubious about the widespread use of business terminology throughout the
Code. Not that it has anything against business terminology as such-it's often very
convenient-but it often lacks precision. It often means something in one part of the
country, something else in another part, or as between different industries or lines of
business.... [Tihe Commission is anxious to see a statute that would have an ascer-
tained or ascertainable meaning.
Panel Discussion on the Uniform Commercial Code, 12 Bus Law 49, 57 (1956). The Com-
mission also expressed doubts about the anticipatory repudiation rules, explaining that
.reasonable grounds for insecurity, adequate assurance of due performance [and] commer-
cial standards," were terms that "should be more concrete, more specific. It did not like
this resort to rather vague, uncertain, indefinite language." Id at 56-57. Even greater
skepticism about the incorporation of trade usage was expressed in connection with the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. See C.M. Bi-
anca and M.J. Bonell, Commentary on the International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales
Convention 105 (Giuffr6 1987).
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because it is difficult to reduce the parameters of some obliga-
tions to a writing. They further maintained that customs are in-
tended and understood by merchants to be an integral part of
their agreement 48 and that these customs, along with the mer-
chants' course of actual performance under their contracts, pro-
vide the best indication of what they intend their writing to
mean.' In addition, at least with respect to using custom to fill
gaps, the incorporation strategy has also been defended on the
grounds that the provisions provided by custom are likely to be
more efficient than those that a court could provide. A closer look
at these justifications, however, suggests that they are based on
inaccurate empirical assumptions and are theoretically weak.
A review of a subset of Code cases, from 1970 to the present,
invoking the usage of trade provision' ° reveals that very few al-
leged customs relate to remote or unforeseen contingencies. 5'
Most of the alleged customs relate to core aspects of any mer-
chant transaction'52 such as the permitted tolerance in quality;
'"See UCC § 2-202 cmt 2.
'"See id at § 2-208 cmt 1 ("[Pjarties themselves know best what they have meant by
their words of agreement and their action under that agreement is the best indication of
what that meaning was.").
'See id at § 1-205. The sample includes cases in Uniform Commercial Code Case Di-
gest para 1205.2(1) (West 1998), under the heading "Usage of Trade-In General" (ex-
cluding supplement). Eliminated were cases dealing with the secured financing aspect of
the transaction; one case where the concept of a usage was simply contrasted with the
concept of course of dealing, see Capitol Converting Equipment Inc v Lep Transport, Inc,
750 F Supp 862, 865 (N D I1 1990) (where the course of dealing or usage dealt with terms
of payment), affd, 965 F2d 391 (7th Cir 1992); and one case dealing with whether a con-
tract existed that held the existence or nonexistence of any usages was irrelevant, see
Wichita Sheet Metal Supply, Inc v Dhalstrom and Ferrell Construction Co, 246 Kan 557,
792 P2d 1043, 1049 (1990). Although the rather small number of cases in the digest cate-
gory "Usage of Trade-In General" has led some to suggest that the Code's incorporation
strategy is, as a practical matter, unimportant, this ignores the numerous other Code pro-
visions and comments that incorporate usage of trade. See note 1.
"'But see Cosden Oil & Chemical Co v Karl 0. Helm Aktiengesellschaft, 736 F2d 1064,
1076 (5th Cir 1984) (considering whether "a custom or trade usage relating to force ma-
jeure existed in the polystyrene industry").
"Most industry trade codes either require these aspects of a transaction to be covered
by contract and/or provide bright-line gap-filling default rules relating to them. See, for
example, Trade Rules of the National Hay Association Rule 1, in NHA, Report of the
Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention 83 (1921) ("It shall be the duty of both buyer and seller
to include in their original articles of trade, however conducted, the following specifica-
tions: Number of cars, tons, or bales. Size of bales. Grade of hay or straw. Price. Terms of
payment. Rate basing point. Time of shipment. Route."); Grain Trade Rules Rule 1 (as
amended Mar 13, 1995), in NGFA, Trading Rules and Arbitration Rules 3 (NGFA 1995)
(noting that it is the duty of the buyer and seller to include in their contract or confirma-
tion, the "(a) Date of contract; (b) Quantity[;] (c) Kind and grade of grain(;] (d) Price[;] (e)
Type of inspection[;] (f) Type of weights[;J (g) Applicable Trade Rules to apply[;] (h) Trans-
portation Specifications: (1) Type of conveyance; (2) Type of billing[:] Transit (storage or
milling)[,] Non Transit[,] Export[,] Multi-car specifications[;) (3) Port of origin or delivery;
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the definition of the good to be exchanged;TM the time required for
notice; the time for inspection and rejection;'" the time, place,
and manner of delivery;'56 price and/or quantity adjustments; 57
payment terms;" and limitations on remedies.'59 Nevertheless,
even if courts looked to custom primarily to fill gaps when remote
contingencies arose, this is precisely the type of situation in
which incorporation is likely to yield the least desirable results.
The more remote or unforeseeable a contingency, the less likely it
is that there is an established customary practice covering it.
Moreover, even if such a custom did exist, one would want to
subject it to particularly exacting scrutiny. Assume for a moment,
as the Code does, that customs are Hayekian in nature, gradually
emerging over time from transactors' independent choices." ° Now
or rate basing point[;] (4) Loading weight requirements[;] (5) Time of shipment or deliv-
ery[;] (6) Route[;] (7) Responsibility for freight increases or decreases[;] [8] Buyer's and
Seller's conveyance[;J (9) Type of bill of lading[;] (i) Payment terms; (j) Other terms").
"'Beachcomber Coins, Inc v Boskett, 166 NJ Super 442, 400 A2d 78, 80 (1979) (where
the alleged custom related to quality verification usually undertaken before a purchase is
final).
'"Williams v Curtin, 807 F2d 1046, 1049 (DC Cir 1986) (where the alleged usage re-
lated to the meaning of the term "slaw cabbage" in a situation where one party contended
it only meant "large cabbage" while the other contended that it meant "all cabbage suit-
able for making coleslaw"); Latex Glove Co v Gruen, 146 111 App 3d 868, 497 NE2d 466, 470
(1986) (where the alleged usage went to the definition of good to be sold, specifically
whether the sale of printed material included the sale of related by products of the print-
ing process).
"Lackawanna Leather Co v Martin & Stewart, Ltd, 730 F2d 1197, 1201-02 (8th Cir
1984) (noting that the appellant sought to introduce usage defining what constitutes a
reasonable time for inspection and revocation).
'" Ore & Chemical Corp v Howard Butcher Trading Corp, 455 F Supp 1150, 1152 (E D
Pa 1978).
"lSouthern Concrete Services, Inc v Mableton Contractors, Inc, 407 F Supp 581 (N D
Ga 1975) (finding that although the contract included price and quantity provisions, one
party claimed a trade usage that these were to be treated as "mere estimates"), affd, 569
F2d 1154 (5th Cir 1978); Nanakuli Paving and Rock Co v Shell Oil Co, 664 F2d 772, 793
(9th Cir 1981) (alleged custom related to the price).
" Ore & Chemical Corp, 455 F Supp at 1152 (where a battle of the forms issue turned
on whether or not provisions in the plaintiffs confirmation dealing with "payment, loading
Incoterms [Paris plus supplement]" were usages of trade); Union Building Materials Corp
v Haas and Haynie Corp, 577 F2d 568, 571 (9th Cir 1978) (where the alleged usage related
to the terms of payment, specifically "whether the payment made to the subcontractor for
materials delivered but not yet installed should include a proportion of the total overhead
and profit for the job").
"' Western Industries, Inc v Newcor Canada Ltd, 739 F2d 1198, 1201 (7th Cir 1984)
(discussing an alleged "custom of the specialty welding machine trade [1 not to give a dis-
appointed buyer his consequential damages but just to allow him either to return the ma-
chines and get his money back or (for example if the breach consists in delivering them
late) keep the machines and get the purchase price reduced to compensate for the costs of
delay"); Posttape Associates v Eastman Kodak Co, 450 F Supp 407, 410 (E D Pa 1978) (dis-
cussing "a trade usage limiting a commercial buyer's remedy to replacement of the negli-
gently manufactured film").
"See notes 176-77 and accompanying text (discussing Hayek's views on the evolution
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consider how a pair of transactors will decide to act when a re-
mote contingency arises. In such a situation, each transactor will
reason that the likelihood that this situation will arise again is,
by definition, remote, so that even if she is a buyer one day and a
seller the next, she should fight for the outcome that gives her the
greatest share of the pie today, rather than the outcome that will,
over time, maximize the size of the pie.'61 As a consequence, to the
extent that patterns of practices dealing with remote contingen-
cies arise, they may favor stronger or particular types of firms.
The review of these Code cases also suggests that the limits
of language were unlikely to have been a significant barrier to
transactors' memorializing the asserted usages in written provi-
sions. In none of the cases surveyed did either party have any dif-
ficulty expressing the content of the usage in clear terms.'62
Moreover, the codification debates contain no indication that
there were rules that drafters would have liked to include, but
that could not be adequately expressed in words."e In addition,
of custom).
"'If, however, the happening of the contingency and the way it is dealt with by these
transactors are observable to members of the relevant market, a transactor concerned
about her reputation might act in the most advantageous way that will be regarded as
"fair." Alternatively, a single very general custom such as "share the loss" might evolve to
deal with large groups of unforeseen contingencies, but again there is no reason to think
that this allocation of losses will create desirable incentives. Nevertheless, unforeseen con-
tingencies, at least in domestic merchant industries, are quite rare since most trade rules
cover adverse weather, labor, transportation, and financial events, making most remain-
ing unforeseen contingencies quite remote.
'"It is, however, important to note that the cost of capturing a usage in writing ex
ante is likely to be higher than the cost of giving it content ex post; and the cost of giving it
content ex post need only be incurred if the relationship breaks down and the parties
disagree about its content. In addition, an ex ante provision memorializing a usage might
have to be more complex than an articulation of a custom ex post since it might have to
cover numerous preconditions and situations that would be irrelevant ex post. If, however,
complexity and nuance are to be invoked as reasons not to memorialize the usage in a con-
tract, but to nevertheless incorporate it as an enforceable part of an agreement, it is im-
portant to note that as the complexity of and number of contextual preconditions to a us-
age increase, the likelihood that there is reasonably widespread consensus about its con-
tent, and that its content can be accurately determined by a court, decreases. In addition,
there are unrecognized costs of not capturing the usage in writing ex ante, such as a
greater risk of misunderstanding and subsequent transaction breakdown, as well as the
costs of the overly high or overly low precautions that the transactors might take if they
do not clearly understand their obligations.
'"The only possible exceptions are the debates relating to grades. While the limits of
language were not invoked as reasons for the inability to arrive at a consensus over how to
memorialize the description of a particular grade in a rule, and most associations either
promulgated standardized written descriptions of quality-see, for example, Grades of
Hay and Straw Established by the National Hay Association, Inc., in NHA, Report of the
Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention 161 (1921) ("No. 1 Timothy hay-Shall be timothy con-
taining not more than one-eighth clover or other tame grasses, bright color, sweet, sound
and well baled.)--or relied on descriptions provided by the government-see Official
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when the lumber industry newsletter reported arbitration deci-
sions in cases arising from a disagreement about "custom of the
trade," the case report would frequently be accompanied by a
suggested contract clause that could be used to avoid misunder-
standings in the future. These clauses did not typically include
linguistically complex formulations."M Finally, even if it is lin-
guistically difficult to capture particular aspects of the desired
performance in words, the incorporation of trade usage may not
United States Standards for Grain, 7 CFR Part 810 (1998)-the fact that rules expressed
in words could not ensure uniform grading given the subjectivity of the determinations
that had to be made was an implicit theme of the debates. Nevertheless, this subjectivity
did not lead the associations to direct arbitrators to incorporate custom on the question of
quality. Rather, most trade rules provided for quality disputes to be resolved by wiseman-
like intermediaries, some run by the industry, as in the green coffee industry-see, for ex-
ample, Green Coffee Association of New York City, Inc, Rules of Arbitration (1989); ATMI
and ACSA, Southern Mill Rules Rules 43-44 at 18 (cited in note 27)-and some run by the
government, as in the grain industry by the Federal Grain Inspection Service. For an
overview of the program, see Tuttle v Missouri Department of Agriculture, 1999 US App
LEXIS 5445, *2-5 (8th Cir).
It is, however, important to note that wholly apart from the inability to fully capture
grade categories in words, there were a number of other possible reasons for using sepa-
rate quality intermediaries. First, to the extent that quality determinations are more
subjective than rulings on other aspects of contractual performance, the use of a separate
quality intermediary might be designed to guard against arbitral bias. Most rules gov-
ering industry-run quality arbitration tribunals contain procedural safeguards against
bias that are not used in regular arbitrations for breach of contract, such as not telling the
arbitrators the names of the parties. See, for example, Green Coffee Association of New
York City, Inc, Rules of Arbitration R VII(I), VIII (1989). Second, because disagreements
about quality are likely to arise even if everyone is acting in good faith, the availability of
a tribunal that can objectively make this determination even before an action for breach is
instituted should help promote cooperation. In practice, the use of a quality intermediary,
particularly in those industries where the assessment of quality is subjective, is not par-
ticularly damaging to commercial relationships as long as recourse to it is not too fre-
quent. This may be because transactors understand that two people acting in good faith
might have different assessments of quality. Interview with Cotton Merchant (July 1996)
(on file with author). Finally, the use of quality certification intermediaries may promote
settlements in disputes where breach of contract for delivering improper quality is alleged.
Having a wiseman determine quality effectively bifurcates the arbitration. In addition,
with the issue of liability clear, and damages under these rules being determined using
objective measures that do not require the revelation of firm-specific information, parties
have all the information they need to settle the suit. See Bernstein, Private Commercial
Law (cited in note 13) (noting that the damage rules of the cotton industry and many
other industries do not require the revelation of firm-specific information).
'"See, for example, NAWLA, Make this Test!, North Coast Weekly Letter No 217 (Apr
6, 1926) ("Where lumber is bought at certain prices 'less 5%' the usual clauses used are
found to be ambiguous and lead to unnecessary controversies at times. In order to comply
with the usual custom in such cases and avoid misunderstanding, the following clause is
suggested: ... 'Prices are f.o.b. mill; underweights to mill; less 5% after deducting actual
freight.'); NAWLA, Questions and Answers, North Coast Weekly Letter No 225 (June 22,
1926) ("[T]he term 'a carload' is broad indeed and its interpretation by different persons
and under different conditions leads to much trouble. The following qualifying clauses are
suggested to avoid misunderstanding: Clause No. 50: 'Load between 25,000' and 30,000' on
this order.' Clause No. 51: 'Not over ___M ft.").
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be a desirable response. The Code requires the content of a usage
to be established as "fact,"' something that it is difficult to do if
the custom cannot be adequately expressed in words. As a conse-
quence, it might be better to encourage transactors to include a
wiseman provision in their contracts, designating an industry ex-
pert who will make the necessary determinations in the event of
a dispute. If the wiseman's determinations were made binding in
any litigated disputes, the wiseman would, in effect, function as a
privately contracted-for merchant jury.1'
As regards the Code's premise that merchants in fact con-
sider usages to be fully part of their agreement, the case studies
of the incorporation debates, together with the text of trade rules,
articles from the trade press, merchant testimony on the pro-
posed Code, and the modern adjudicative approaches of many
merchant tribunals suggest that merchants did not view written
and unwritten custom, much less unwritten custom and written
contract provisions, as being on par with one another.
First, not all customs were included in the trade rules. This
suggests that some were viewed as suitable or desirable for third-
party enforcement while others were not.67 Second, some rules,
like the WSRs, explicitly distinguished between written and un-
written custom in their hierarchy of authority for interpreting
contracts."" Third, the trade press in various industries is filled
with statements that a practice may be customary but that those
who want it to be followed should include a provision to that ef-
fect in their contracts.'69 Fourth, in the rare instances that early
-UCC § 1-205(2) ("The existence and scope of... a usage are to be proved as facts" by
the litigant, who must then apply it to the circumstances of the case.).
'"Llewellyn's early drafts of the Code contained a merchant jury provision that would
have permitted the submission of many types of determinations to merchant experts
whose decisions would be binding at trial. See Wiseman, 100 Harv L Rev at 527-29 (cited
in note 4).
"In addition, the records of interassociation debates relating to amendments to the
Southern Mill Rules, a set of rules governing cotton transactions between merchants and
mills that are jointly drafted by the American Cotton Shippers Association ("ACSA), a
trade association of merchants, and the American Textile Manufacturers Institute
("ATMI"), a trade association of mills, suggest that there were practices each association
was willing to encourage its members to abide by, but that they refused to include in the
rules as legally enforceable obligations. See, for example, Minutes of the 1990
ACSAIATMI Joint Meeting 3 (June 19, 1990) (while the ATMI rejected a proposed ACSA
rule dealing with sample approvals, the "ATMI did agree to notify its members regarding
shippers' concerns with sample approvals"); Minutes of Joint ACSA-ATMI Meeting 4 (June
8-9, 1981) (unpublished document, on file with author) (noting that "ATMI rejected any
change in the rules (relating to rejections], but advised that they would ask ATMI mem-
bers to handle rejections in a more expeditious manner").
'" See note 100 and accompanying text.
'"See, for example, Pacific Coast Shippers Association ("PCSA7), The Secretary's
Weekly Letter No 82 (July 24, 1923) ("When a wholesaler orders lumber from an inland
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trade codes contained provisions directing arbitrators to take cus-
tom into account, a choice of custom provision was often included
in the rule.'70 The inclusion of such provisions suggests that mer-
chants recognized that customs varied from locality to locality.
Fifth, there is a great deal of evidence that the practices that
some industry participants described as customs were viewed by
others as undesirable practices that ought to be changed, not as
ideal, implicit contract provisions.'7' Sixth, when testifying on the
proposed Code, merchants took the position that even practices
that were almost universally followed in day-to-day relationships
should not necessarily be written into law. For example, mer-
chants acknowledged the practice of giving a price adjustment for
nonconforming tender, but argued strongly for retention of the
perfect tender rule, explaining that "the price adjustments that
merchants made when goods 'are not entirely up to standard'-
'the give and take of ordinary mercantile life'-should not be
made obligatory in the law." 2
mill for delivery at a port for shipment by water, while it is customary for such shipments
to be loaded on open equipment, it is not obligatory on the part of the mill who is allowed
to use any available equipment unless it is specifically stated on the order that stock must
be loaded on open equipment.").
17 See, for example, Rule 5, 11 WWGT 35 (Nov 5, 1921-22) ("[Blilling instructions must
be finmished the Railroad Company in accordance with the custom then in vogue at the
shipping point."). See also ASTA, 1955 Yearbook 193 ("In the absence of any specific
stipulation in the contract of sale or purchase applying to the type of package or packag-
ing, it will be presumed that the custom prevailing in the area of production will apply.").
But see Trade Rules of the Grain Dealers National Association Rule 36(e), 10 WWGT 40
(Nov 20, 1920-21) (requiring brokers to negotiate "in accordance with the rules and cus-
toms governing such transactions"). Similarly, when answering questions involving cus-
tom, the NGFA was also careful to specify which locality's custom governs. See Secretary's
Book (no page number, dated 1903) (cited in note 59) (stating that when the Trade Rules
committee was asked, "[sihould a receiver charge seller commission on grain failing to
grade to contract when shipper orders elsewhere," it "recomm[ended] that the usage of the
market to which the grain may have been consigned shall govern").
.. See, for example, notes 127-29 and accompanying text (silk); ASTA Yearbook 30-31
(1910) (where a member stated, "I wish to call your attention to a custom that prevails
among the Seed Trade, and which seems entirely unnecessary. It is the long term Credit
on Garden Seed. There really is no reason for this custom .... This is a relic of the old
days, and out of line with present day business methods, and is well worthy of your seri-
ous consideration," and further noted that the custom may survive because it gives the
"well established house a little advantage that his newer competitor finds hard to meet").
However, simple cognitive bias towards doing things in the traditional way may also have
played a role in locking in traditional practices. See, for example, Misuse of Order Bill of
Lading: Shippers Should Stop Improper Practices-Following Old Customs Without
Knowing Why, 10 WWGT 30 (Feb 20, 1921-22) ("[Mlany shippers are following a custom
which has prevailed for years without knowing why or having any good reason for doing
so. In many cases, the shipping clerk is merely following precedent without knowing
why."). See also text accompanying notes 127-29 (silk).
'Wiseman, 100 Harv L Rev at 526 (cited in note 4). In arguing for the perfect tender
rule, merchants explained that the type of buyer opportunism made possible by the rule
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Finally, modem merchant tribunals are, for the most part,
very wary of taking unwritten custom into account in deciding
cases.1 3 Although they will sometimes look to it when faced with
a true contractual gap, they have a much narrower conception of
a gap than courts applying the Code, and they will almost never
look to custom to interpret or vary a provision in a written con-
tract or memorandum. 74 In those instances when industry expert
arbitrators do look to customs, they sometimes signal their dis-
comfort by criticizing the contracting practices of the parties.
could "take care of [itself] 'mighty quick' through other merchant practices." Id. In sum,
"[i]n the merchants' view, the combination of the perfect tender rule and nonlegal sanc-
tions was more advantageous than a rule of substantial performance with judicial discre-
tion.' Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1801 (cited in note 13).
'See Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1801 (cited in note 13); Bernstein, Private Com-
mercial Law at 10-11 (cited in note 13).
In the early days of their operation, however, these merchant tribunals looked to cus-
tom more often. There are a number of possible explanations for the initial use and grad-
ual abandonment of incorporating custom for any purpose other than filling a pure con-
tractual gap. First, even in the past, customs were not typically looked to for the purposes
of varying terms or defining the meaning of written provisions, but rather to fill gaps. Be-
cause many early sets of rules were less detailed than modern trade rules, and written
contracts tended to be less complete, perhaps because most firms were small and more
trade was local and personal, there were more gaps to be filled. See No Change in Rules,
20 WWGT 34 (Nov 30, 1930-31) ("I have been chairman of the Rules Committee for a
number of years and it is very noticeable that suggestions for changes and inquiries for in-
terpretation are becoming fewer each year. It is possible that this may be because my
opinions are not of value, but I prefer to believe that it is because of a constantly increas-
ing understanding of the mutual obligations and customs over different sections of the
country, and through the Grain and Feed Dealers National Association a uniform and fair
interpretation of rules and custom."). Second, in the early years more trade was local in
scope, so those local customs that did exist may have been a sound basis for deciding
cases. It is, however, important to exercise caution in drawing a straight inference that
because merchant tribunals rejected incorporation, the public commercial law should as
well. Merchant associations have institutional alternatives available to help solve the
problems of contractual incompleteness that are unavailable in the public legal system.
They can promulgate multiple sets of trade codes, carefiully tailored to different types of
transactions, as well as standard form contracts that are even more closely tailored to par-
ticular contexts. In addition, they can draw on pre-existing forces of shaming and social
suasion to encourage and discourage particular types of behavior, forces that are unavail-
able to either courts or to many of the industries whose contractual relations are governed
by the Code. See, for example, Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J Legal Stud 115 (1992); Bernstein,
Private Commercial Law at 16-25. However, because merchants testifying on the proposed
Code sharply criticized the incorporation strategy-see notes 144-47 and accompanying
text-the fact that most of their private legal systems reject this strategy is nonetheless
quite telling.
.. Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1775-80 (cited in note 13). The NGFA arbitrators also
do not permit custom to trump trade rules, even though the rules are said to be based on
customary practices. See, for example, Texas Farm Products Co v Topeka Mill & Elevator
Co, NGFA Case No 1507 (NGFA 1970) ("While trade practices in the Kansas City area
may differ in accepted meaning of terminology" from the practices in Texas, "this does not
relieve the Seller from complying with Rule 38 unless so specified in writing.'). See also
note 217.
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More generally, merchants appear to have a clear sense that
practices will often vary from contract provisions, sometimes in
systematic and sometimes in relationship-specific ways, but that
these variations should be left to the extralegal realm for their
enforcement and. are essentially irrelevant to any dispute re-
quiring third-party adjudication.'
The Code's incorporation strategy has also been defended on
the grounds that, at least as regards the gap-filling use of custom,
customs are likely to be more efficient than any term the court
can construct. The strength of this argument, however, depends
strongly on acceptance of the strong-form Hayekian view of the
evolution of custom that implicitly animates the Code, a view that
suggests that efficient custom should evolve through the natural
selection of rules and practices."6 This is, however, a view of cus-
tom that Hayek himself doubted in its purest form, 177 and that
seems increasingly untenable in light of the insights of modern
game theory and cognitive psychology. Game theory makes clear
that regularities in behavior can emerge from sets of circum-
stances vastly different from those envisioned by Hayek. For ex-
ample, customs may reflect the unique or nonunique equilibria
that are produced by interactions characterized by any of a num-
ber of games. These equilibria may or may not be efficient. Their
evolution may also be highly path-dependent and strongly influ-
enced by information cascades"8 or any of a number of heuristic
"'For an extensive discussion of this point and supporting evidence, see Bernstein,
144 U Pa L Rev at 1777 & n 43 (cited in note 13).
1
"See FA Hayek, 1 Law, Legislation, and Liberty: Rules and Order 35-54, 74-91 (Chi-
cago 1973). However, Hayek himself recognized that rules arising from an evolutionary
process may "develop in very undesirable directions, and [ ] when this happens correction
by deliberate legislation" may be "the only practicable way out." Id at 88.
'"Id at 100-01 (noting that for the best rules to emerge both the evolutionary forces of
spontaneous order and the actions of courts and legislature are all necessary, explaining
that "the system of rules as a whole . . . is the outcome of a process of evolution in the
course of which spontaneous growth of customs and deliberate improvements of the par-
ticulars of an existing system have constantly interacted").
... See David Hirshleifer, The blind leading the blind. Social influence, fads, and in-
formational cascades, reprinted in Mariano Tommasi and Kathryn I. Ierulli, eds, The new
economics ofhuman behavior 188, 191 (Cambridge 1995) ("[Aln informational cascade oc-
curs when the information implicit in predecessors' actions (or resulting payoffs) is so con-
clusive that a rational follower will unconditionally imitate them, without regard to in-
formation from other sources.... [Ciascades often spontaneously develop on the basis of
very little information. People converge on one action quite rapidly, and their decisions are
idiosyncratic."). Because information cascades arise when people give relatively large
weight to the behavior they observe around them, information cascades may well explain
the existence of highly localized customary practices that differ widely from locality-to-
locality in ways that cannot be explained purely in terms of transactional differences or
other efficiency related criteria. See President Clement Makes Committee Appointments,
10 WWGT 25 (Nov 20, 1921-22) (stating that outside the context of a particular dispute,
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biases. 79 Although game theory also suggests that the usages re-
flected in some of these types of equilibria are unstable and can
therefore be changed easily if they are thought to be undesirable,
there are a number of forces that operate on commercial prac-
tices-including the heuristic biases that helped create them as
well as coordination problems and interpretive, educational, and
enforcement-related network externalities'..--that make it less
likely than game theory would predict that trade practices,
whether written or unwritten, that survive for a certain period of
time are going to change.' 8 '
Moreover, even if customs did arise through Hayekian-type
natural selection, there is no reason to think that they would pro-
how the terms "prompt," "quick," and "immediate" are defined when transactors are given
a menu of time provisions to choose from has no distributional consequences). Although
the theory of informational cascades shows that the results of the cascades are vulnerable
to change, commercial customs established by cascades are subject to the same lock-in
forces as other commercial customs, and in practice are therefore less likely to change in
response to the introduction of new information than the models would suggest.
' See, for example, Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corpo-
rate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 Wash U L Q
347 (1996) (discussing how cognitive biases, including the status quo bias, the endowment
effect, anchoring bias, conformity bias, and herd behavior, influence contracting decisions
and reinforce recourse to standard written terms). Transactors may be particularly wary
of suggesting departures from custom in markets where such suggestions are rare, since
the relational costs of doing so are likely to be particularly high.
'"Interpretive network externalities are the benefits created by the fact that, as com-
pared to the meaning of a specially drafted provision, the meaning of a widely used con-
tractual provision is likely both to be clearer (since it has already been interpreted by
courts) and to become clearer over time (because it will be more likely to be interpreted by
courts in future disputes). See generally Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law,
and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va L Rev 757, 775-79 (1995). An educational network ex-
ternality is the increased certainty and reduced chance of misunderstanding and transac-
tion breakdown that result from using the standard terms provided by the trade rules,
terms that trade associations go to great lengths to explain to their members and that re-
ceive wide coverage in the trade press. See text accompanying notes 229-30. The enforce-
ment network benefit follows from the interpretive and educational network benefits.
When most market transactors understand a term, and the violation of that term is either
observable to market participants or can be credibly revealed to them at moderate cost,
multilateral reputational sanctions can be imposed on the breacher. These sanctions de-
pend for their effectiveness on widespread consensus about the standard used to assess
whether or not behavior was proper. In contrast, unusual terms, whether written or un-
written, are backed primarily by legal sanctions, bilateral reputational sanctions (most
commonly termination of trade), and some negative gossip. This, in turn, creates a prefer-
ence for standardized legal and extralegal terms.
"'Indeed, the trade press and association records in many industries suggest that it
was extraordinarily difficult to change custom, see note 129 and accompanying text, and
that customs that no longer made even a modicum of business sense were often followed.
Misuse of Order Bill of Lading, 10 WWGT 30 (Feb 20, 1920-21) ('[A] great many shippers
are following a custom which has prevailed for years without knowing why or having any
good reason for doing so. In many cases, the shipping clerk is merely following precedent
without knowing why.").
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vide desirable, legally enforceable contract provisions.'82 In the
absence of an authority who stands ready to promulgate and en-
force customs, a custom will develop only if it was first a practice
that was followed by a pair of transactors who found it in their
best interest to do so.' The first time the practice was followed,
it would have been legally unenforceable since it would be neither
a course of performance nor a course of dealing. As a conse-
quence, the practice could only condition on information that was
observable to the transactors."M Without the threat of legal com-
pulsion, a practice that conditioned on information that was only
verifiable," that is, a practice whose applicability could only be
determined by a third party who could compel the parties to re-
veal information, would not be workable. So even ff customs were
perfect Hayekian customs that arose from the force of natural
selection operating on practices, there is no reason to expect them
to be optimal legally enforceable contract provisions or necessar-
ily better provisions than a court could construct using any of a
number of interpretive methods."
"See Posner, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1705-25 (cited in note 9) (discussing the possibility
and potential causes of inefficient norms).
1
" However, it is possible that under the Code a practice that came into being by condi-
tioning only on observable information might, as it evolved first into a course of perform-
ance, then into a course of dealing, and finally into a custom, come to condition on infor-
mation that was a verifiable proxy for the observable information that the practice origi-
nally conditioned on. This process of transformation would likely be accelerated by parties'
attempts to enforce these practices in court, since in each dispute the parties would be re-
quired to adduce verifiable information in support of their claim. As a custom comes in-
creasingly to condition on verifiable information, unless the observability conditions con-
currently survive the evolution, the cooperation-promoting aspect of the custom will begin
to disintegrate.
'" Observable information is information that the transactors themselves can obtain at
the relevant time at a cost they regard as reasonable ex ante. The observability of a condi-
tion may change over the life of a contracting relationship as the transactors learn about
one anothers' operations, thereby expanding, over time, the extralegally contractible as-
pects of the deal.
"Verifiable information is information that transactors would, ex ante, view as both
possible and financially desirable to prove to a third party in the event a dispute arose.
See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agree-
ments and Judicial Strategies, 21 J Legal Stud 271, 279 (1992). Some observable informa-
tion is also verifiable, but not all verifiable information is observable.
... The preference for contract over unwritten custom in trade associations is, however,
influenced by considerations that may play out differently in the legal arena. While un-
written customs are subject to the lock-in forces and other cognitive distortions discussed
in the text, most of these forces also operate in largely the same way on written contrac-
tual provisions in industries without trade rules or centrally drafted contractual forms.
See Klausner, 81 Va L Rev 757 (cited in note 180). The only difference is that written pro-
visions containing customary understandings can initially condition on verifiable informa-
tion. If one thought that lock-in forces caused more inefficiency in written terms than in
unwritten terms, it might be desirable to interpret written provisions by reference to un-
written custom as the Code directs. If, however, one thought that unwritten customs were
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More generally, both the Code's incorporation strategy and
the dominant evolutionary views of the emergence of custom are
based on the same curious assumption. Namely, if most transac-
tors in a market could costlessly arrive at and draft a term gov-
erning an issue, they would likely arrive at the same term, the
customary term. Nevertheless, in many, if not most, contractual
settings, this assumption is likely to be false. Transactors are
likely to have different perceived trade-offs between price and
other terms, different abilities to use slightly imperfect goods, dif-
ferent abilities to finance their cash gap, and different risk pref-
erences. There is no reason to suppose that, given these differ-
ences, all transactors would choose the same contractual provi-
sions. 7 Indeed, even in cash commodity sales that are relatively
standard as compared to many of the transactions governed by
the Code, trade rules typically offer transactors a menu of possi-
ble terms for each core aspect of their trade.'s
more subject to these forces, it would be undesirable to look to them unless faced by an
unambiguous gap. In trade associations, however, the trade rules creation and amend-
ment processes, and the widespread use of association-drafted standard forms, means that
written contractual provisions can be more readily changed and are less subject to lock-in
forces than both unwritten custom and perhaps written contracts in nonassociation domi-
nated markets. Indeed, the decision of trade associations to create written sets of trade
rules might be understood as an efficiency-enhancing institutional response to problems
inherent in the evolution ofboth custom and individually drafted contracts. See Bernstein,
Private Commercial Law at 28-30 (cited in note 13).
"In addition, it is likely that transactors in a given market will have more defined
transaction types in their mind than a court will, and how exactly the court defines the
type of transaction perceived to be at issue may, as Craswell has argued, be outcome de-
terminative. Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist? (cited in note 8). Yet it is quite likely that
this is the type of determination a court will get wrong. Consider a contract between a
merchant-seller of cotton and a mill-buyer. There are many mills that produce a variety of
goods, depending on the demand of their customers. Suppose the mill sometimes makes
sheets, and that when it does it is terribly important that a particular quality of cotton is
used. Other times it makes denim, a production process where quality is much less impor-
tant. A court attempting to find a trade custom relating to the permissible quality varia-
tion might well aggregate over both types of transactions, yet one would not expect the op-
timal amount of quality variation to be the same in contracts for goods to produce sheets
as in contracts for goods to produce denim. Or, consider a contract for the sale of silk. A
court might not distinguish between a contract for silk to be used to make gloves and
other types of silk, yet in the silk trade, when it comes to payment time, the difference is
outcome determinative. Compare Standard Rules of the Silk Glove Group Rule 4, in Or-
ganization of Glove Silk Group, 2 Silkworm 17 (Mar 1921) ("Shipment made within one
week after specified date of delivery shall constitute good delivery.") (emphasis added);
with Broad Silk Rules Adopted, 2 Silkworm 10 (January 1921) ("Rule 5 . . . shipment
made within two weeks after specified date of delivery shall constitute a good delivery.")
(emphasis added).
'"See, for example, NGFA, Trade Rules and Arbitration Rules Grain Trade Rule 8
("Time of Shipment or Delivery") (1995) (defining a selection of time designations includ-
ing "immediate," "quick," "prompt," and "first half of the month shipment"); id at Rule 4A
(defining several weight classifications to choose from); id at Rule 4B (setting out several
types of inspections).
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Moreover, the Code's incorporation strategy reflexively in-
corporates customs into all contracts in a market, unless the cus-
toms are clearly and specifically negated,'89 and looks to customs
to interpret even explicit and facially unambiguous contract pro-
visions."9 It thereby moves the meaning of explicit provisions as
close as possible to the meaning of customary terms, 9' and in so
doing transforms many customary practices into quasi-
mandatory standardized provisions in all contracts in the rele-
'UCC § 2-202 cmt 2 ("Unless carefilly negated [usages of trade] have become an
element of the meaning of the words used."). In addition, because the duty of good faith
cannot be "disclaimed by agreement,' id at § 1-102(3), and because the Comment notes
that the good faith requirement is to be "implemented by Section 1-205 on course of deal-
ing and usage of trade," contracting out of trade usage is quite difficult. Id at § 1-203 cmt.
"0See Nanakuli Paving, 664 F2d at 794-805 (binding seller to trade usage where a
contract for the sale of asphalt contained an explicit provision that stated that the seller's
posted price at the time of delivery would govern, but the buyer claimed that it was enti-
tled to "price protection'-a usage of trade in the asphalt-paving trade in Hawaii that re-
quired the seller to sell at the original price all the asphalt that the buyer had committed
to use in jobs on which it had already bid in reliance on the seller's price). See also Colum-
bia Nitrogen Corp v Royster Co, 451 F2d 3, 7 (4th Cir 1971) (holding that, despite express
price and quantity terms and a standard integration clause, evidence to show that it was a
custom and usage of the fertilizer industry that "express price and quantity terms in con-
tracts for material ... are mere projections," was admissible to establish a consistent, ad-
ditional enforceable term in the parties' agreement); Sherrock v Commercial Credit Corp,
277 A2d 708, 711 (Del Super 1971) (finding buyer to be a merchant buyer and therefore
obligated to follow reasonable commercial standards in the trade, and holding that the
buyer's decision to pay early and let seller retain possession for several days thereafter
was not in accordance with the custom of the automobile trade and was unreasonable, ex-
plaining that "departures from customary usages and commercial practices should be
viewed as strong indicia that the practice is not reasonable"), revd on other grounds, 290
A2d 648 (Del Super 1972).
"' Llewellyn's preference for moving the meanings of terms and obligations as close as
practicable to their customary meaning is amply reflected in the legislative history of the
Code. In a comment on a proposed draft of the Code, Llewellyn wrote:
No inconsistency of language and background exists merely because the words used
mean something different to an outsider than they do to the merchants who used that
language in the light of the commercial background against which they contracted.
This is the necessary result of applying commercial standards and principles of good
faith to the agreement .... Moreover, where the commercial background normally
gives to a term in question some breadth of meaning so that it describes a range of
acceptable tolerances rather than a sharp-edged single line of action, any attempted
narrowing of this meaning by one party is so unusual as not likely to be expected or
perceived by the other. Therefore, attention must be called to a desire to contract at
material variance from the accepted commercial pattern of contract or use of lan-
guage. Thus, this Act rejects any "surprise' variation from the fair and normal
meaning of the agreement.
Cited in Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary Accelera-
tion: Of Lewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 Tex L Rev 169, 200
(1989).
For a careful discussion of the jurisprudential inseparability ofthe Code's duty of good
faith, its reliance on usage, and its definition of agreement, which traces the evolution of
these ideas in Llewellyn's thought and through drafts of the Code, see id at 199-202. See
also Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1782-87 (cited in note 13).
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vant market.192 It also prevents transactors from actually follow-
ing a custom that they perceive as a desirable, legally unenforce-
able practice, but undesirable legally enforceable contract provi-
sion, because if they follow the custom on more than one occasion,
it would likely be transformed into a legally binding course of
dealing or course of performance. In addition, if there are, in fact,
customs that cannot be linguistically captured in a contract pro-
vision ex ante, the incorporation strategy transforms them into
mandatory terms because in order to be excluded, the contract
'"Although the incorporation strategy implicitly treats many customs as terms in
standard form contracts, often referred to as contracts of adhesion, customs do not, for the
most part, engender similar distrust. But see Danzig, 27 Stan L Rev at 626-27 (cited in
note 6). Although many of the objections to standard form contracts are untenable from an
economic point of view, these objections are widely accepted, so it is important to note that
they provide an even stronger ground for objecting to implicit, customary, standard form
contract provisions.
The two main grounds for distrust of standardized contracts are "[flirst, [that] most
persons presented with standardized forms do not bother to familiarize themselves with
the specific content," and "second, [that] because the advantages of forms would be lost if
bargains were open to routine renegotiation, their users are often unwilling to do business
on other than standard terms." Avery Weiner Katz, Standard Form Contracts, in New-
man, ed, 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary at 502 (cited in note 21). Both of these concerns
are even more problematic in relation to custom. First, the per transaction cost to a trans-
actor of reading a standard-form contract drafted by someone he does business with fre-
quently is small in comparison to learning all of the practices in vogue in the other trans-
actor's market. Indeed the cost, difficulty, and bother of learning the practices of numer-
ous localities was a major impetus behind the drafting of national grain rules. Are the As-
sociation's Trade Rules in Danger?, 13 WWGT 28 (Feb 20, 1923-24) ("No buyer can possi-
bly keep up with all the rules and regulations of all the shipping markets of the country.
That's why the National rules were formulated.'). The sometimes costly efforts that trade
associations make to educate their members about the content of rules and customs sug-
gest that even the easily accessible rules are not that widely known. See 11 WWGT 34
(Nov 5, 1921-22) ("There has never been an annual report of an arbitration committee that
did not point out the lack of knowledge of the trade rules shown by the rank and file of the
members.'). Moreover, small merchants are less likely than large transactors to know the
content of commercial customs (particularly those outside of their immediate area), in part
because custom is learned through observation of, and participation in, transactions and
smaller transactors participate in fewer transactions. See, for example, NHA, Report of the
Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention 86 (1921) (defending the retention of a written rule on
reshipment, on the grounds that "the small country shipper is usually not well posted on
rules and customs and the association should very carefully guard his interests. The man
of broader experience is usually well informed and is entirely capable of looking after his
own interest but not so with the smaller shipper who innocently trusts his business to a
market').
Second, transactors are likely to find it undesirable, and perhaps difficult, to persuade
others to do business on terms that radically depart from custom or commercial standards.
Because transactors who propose to transact on explicitly noncustomary terms are likely
to be viewed with suspicion, their proposals are likely to be met with counter proposals, so
the relational costs of even proposing a departure from custom might be high and the as-
sociated risk of transaction breakdown significant. See Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and
Default Rules Analysis, 3 S Cal Interdisc L J 59, 69-73 (1994).
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must negate them with specificity, 193 something that by assump-
tion is not possible.
Conclusion
In sum, the incorporation strategy is based on an overly
broad conception of the types and geographical scope of customs
that consistently exist in merchant communities. However, even
if one believes that some customs do exist, support for the incor-
poration strategy in merchant industries would not necessarily
follow. In most merchant industries, transactions are consum-
mated orally and confirmed by sending standard form memo-
randa with long, back-of-the-page printed recitals. In such con-
texts, those customary understandings that truly do exist could
easily and inexpensively be memorialized in standard form boi-
lerplate. In other words, the number of customs that are clearly
enough defined and widely enough known to be true implicit con-
tract provisions, but that are nonetheless not worth including in
contractual boilerplate, is likely to be quite small.
Nevertheless, because the concept of custom seems to retain
some salience to merchants-who use it variously to describe
their own past contracting practices or the loose distribution of
contractual behavior in the market as a whole-it is useful to ex-
plore in more detail the role played by the notion of commercial
custom in merchant relationships.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP-CREATING ROLE OF CUSTOM
The empirical evidence presented in Part I casts doubt on the
systematic existence of industry-wide unwritten customs that are
generally known, geographically coextensive with the scope of
trade, and implicitly assented to by market transactors. It also
substantiates the likely existence of some local customs as well as
some relatively common industry-wide practices. More generally,
however, the evidence strongly suggests that the types of customs
that exist, even in these rather well-defined merchant communi-
ties, do not amount to anything close to the all-pervasive sets of
implicit gap-filling provisions and dictionary-type interpretive
guides assumed by the Code.
Nevertheless, while merchants do not, for the most part, con-
ceive of customs as providing them with legally enforceable con-
tract terms, most merchants evidence a keen interest in learning
and talking about the way business is usually done in their in-
dustry. One explanation for this interest is that transactors ap-
" See note 189.
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proach transactions, particularly those with a stranger, with a
rough sense, derived from aggregating behavior over the market
as a whole, of the way such deals are usually concluded and per-
formed.' These aggregations (or distributions) of behavior,
which might be termed weak-form customs, play an important
role in the development of commercial relationships. This role can
best be understood by drawing on the insights produced by basic
signaling models and by recognizing that many merchant-to-
merchant commercial transactions have features that can best be
captured by the intuitions underlying repeat-play prisoners' di-
lemma models,'95 in which cooperation is best established and
maintained when transactors follow any of a number of tit-for-tat
strategies." These strategies dictate responding to cooperation
with cooperation and defection (or a series of defections) with de-
fection for a defined period of time followed by a return to coop-
eration.
One of the main barriers to both establishing and maintain-
ing commercial cooperation is that it may be difficult for a trans-
actor to determine, by simply observing actual outcomes, whether
the other transactor has defected. Making this determination is a
difficult and error-prone process, particularly in merchant indus-
tries where the commodity being sold passes through many
hands' and the quality of the good is so strongly affected by cli-
matic, storage, and transportation conditions that even after op-
timal precautions have been taken, a significant probability re-
mains that performance will not be exactly as promised. 98 Each
' Alternatively, the customs and commercial standards incorporated by the Code may
actually be important sources of contractual understanding for smaller merchants who
engage in mostly local trade.
'For an overview of these signaling models that explores their application to numer-
ous legal issues, see Eric A. Posner, Law, Cooperation and Rational Choice (1998) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with U Chi L Rev). The discussion here differs slightly from Pos-
ner's in that the costly action that constitutes the signal sent by the seller is not a dead-
weight loss (in the way that burning money, which would also send the requisite signal,
would be a deadweight loss) because the high quality delivery will benefit the buyer.
'"See Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive
Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life 113-15 (W.W. Norton 1991) (discussing a va-
riety of tit-for-tat strategies).
'For example, a bale of cotton may pass though the hands of a farmer, a grain eleva-
tor operator, a country merchant, a city merchant, a warehouseman, another city mer-
chant or broker, a transport company (railroad, truck, or barge), and a mill. See generally
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law (cited in note 13).
"See, for example, Gordon, A Century of Agricultural Abundance at 49 (cited in note
56) ("Each step in the marketing chain [of grain] involves commitments and contracts be-
tween two or more parties. The vagaries of weather and transportation congestion and
delays can add further disruptions. From the simplest grain purchase contract with farm-
ers to complex, multi-layered string trades, there is an inherent opportunity for misinter-
pretation of a contract term or condition or nonperformance."); NHA, Report of the Fourth
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time a transactor mistakenly classifies an outcome as defection,
the likelihood that she will respond by defecting now or in the fu-
ture increases, making relationship breakdown more likely."
In order to understand the role played by these weak-form
customs, consider a seller (S) who is dealing with a buyer (B) for
the first time in a market where repeat-dealing relationships,
once established, have an economic advantage over discrete
transactions, perhaps because they reduce cooperation and per-
formance costs as the transactors learn about one another's ex-
pectations and business operations.' Suppose further that at the
outset of the relationship B knows nothing about S. In such a
situation, B will assume that ifS is trustworthy (that is, if he is a
cooperator) he will perform within customary bounds on all as-
pects of the deal, and that if he is not trustworthy (that is, if he is
a defector) his performance will fall outside these bounds. The
contract takes this into account through the price term. B is
willing to pay a price corresponding to the customary ranges of
performance on all aspects of the contract, weighted by the prob-
ability of their occurrence. These customary ranges roughly,
though imperfectly, reflect the aggregate performances of all
Annual Meeting 23 (1897) ("[A] shipper may in perfect honesty consign a car of hay to the
receiver under the impression that it is No. 1 hay, and if it proves to be No. 2 hay, that is
not conclusive evidence that the shipper is dishonest.").
'"Where two transactors are playing a "pure" tit-for-tat strategy, a single act that is
misinterpreted by Transactor 2 as defection will lead him to defect in response. This will,
in turn, lead Transactor 1 to defect, and cooperation will disintegrate. In real-world inter-
actions, however, because a "pure" tit-for-tat strategy is so sensitive to breakdown, game
theory suggests that a more successful strategy would be a modified, more "forgiving" tit-
for-tat strategy that does not dictate responding to every bad outcome (that is every real
or suspected defection) by inflicting a punishment. See Dixit and Nalebuff, Thinking Stra-
tegically at 113 (cited in note 196). These relatively forgiving strategies, such as tit-for-two
tats, are commonly followed by merchants. See Bernstein, Private Commercial Law at 57-
59 (cited in note 13) (noting that a strategy of negotiating forgiving adjustments until a
relationship is terminated is common in transactions between cotton merchants and cot-
ton mills; and noting that a strategy of ignoring defections or making forgiving adjust-
ments in response to a certain number of defections and responding to defections thereaf-
ter with punishment of a limited variety, such as refusing to deal for a specified period,
and then returning to cooperation is commonly followed in transactions among merchant
members of the Memphis Cotton Exchange).
'oFor example, as S learns about B's business, he can more accurately assess when
slightly nonconforming tender will or will not disrupt the buyer's business (if tendered
with a price adjustment) and can adjust his precaution investment accordingly. As one
Texas Feed Dealer explained, "I prefer to deal with old customers since when I ship, I
know that the goods will be suitable and will therefore be accepted even if they are not ex-
actly to contract." Interview with Texas Feed Dealer (1999) (on file with author). Simi-
larly, in the cotton industry, where mills and merchants have been unable to agree on
rules regarding the unloading of truck shipments-particularly, the hours receiving sta-
tions must operate, the order in which arriving trucks will be unloaded and graded, etc.-
knowing the practices of the mill he is selling to is very important to the merchant. See
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law (cited in note 13).
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transactors in the market and are largely common knowledge to
both buyers and sellers.2" Suppose, for example, that quality is
the key term in a wheat contract. If the contract calls for No. 3
Wheat, the weak-form customary range would correspond to how
often in the market, when a contract calls for No. 3 Wheat, No. 3
exactly is delivered, how often something better than No. 3 is de-
livered, and how often something worse than No. 3 is delivered. 2
Returning again to B and S. If S's performance is within the
customary range, B will conclude that S is a cooperator and will
enter into another deal. This will continue as long as S's perform-
ance is within the customary range and, over time, a pattern of
S's performance being closer than customary to the desired per-
formance emerges. In these early stages of the emergent contrac-
tual relationship, S may be taking a loss on each contract. He is
taking the level of precaution associated with delivering close to
the promised performance, but is only receiving the price associ-
ated with customary ranges of performance. However, S's will-
ingness to take this initial loss adds value to the relationship. 3 It
is a credible signal to B that S has a low discount rate-that is,
that he plans to continue to cooperate with B in the future. Over
time, if S's performance is closer than average to the desired per-
formance, here the promised quality, B will see this course of
"'Although these aggregations of practices are unlikely to supply the optimal per-
formance ranges for any particular pair of transactors, aggregating as they do over trans-
actions that likely differed greatly in both purpose and scope, they may nonetheless be
valuable in these early rounds precisely because they are common knowledge. The ele-
ment of value created by the fact that they are common knowledge may outweigh their
lack of a tailored fit with the specifications and error ranges the transactors really desire.
B and S should be equally able to observe aggregate market behavior so weak-form cus-
toms should be fairly good cooperation initiators. But see note 223 and accompanying text.
'Transactors seem to instinctively use these types of ranges to assess whether the
other transactor intended to cooperate or defect. See, for example, Secretary's Book at 80-
81 (cited in note 59) ("Most dealers state on their card bids that grain missing grade will
be taken at market difference on day of arrival, and I believe that a fair interpretation of
this term means that the seller who accepts it must deliver grain of the grade he agrees to,
or some so near it in quality that he may reasonably expect it to grade. If a person sets up
a target, turns his back to it and shoots in the opposite direction, it cannot be reasonably
said that he misses the target, and it is equally true that if a person sells No. 2 yellow corn
and delivers corn which inspects No. 4 or no grade, it cannot be reasonably said that the
corn missed grade. This may seem an exaggerated illustration, but it explains the point.').
'Alternatively, S may take the customary level of precaution and deliver only within
the customary range, thereby not incurring any loss in the initial rounds. In these early
rounds, the transactors will still learn about one another's operations, giving rise to
switching costs, which may facilitate the creation of a repeat-dealing relationship. How-
ever, this method of establishing a relationship is less likely to succeed than the method
discussed into the text, since S's behavior in earlier rounds conveys less information about
his likely future behavior to B.
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dealing ("CD") emerge. Gradually, she will come to pay S a higher
price to reflect this better performance.'
Despite the loss he suffers in early rounds, S has confidence
that, once a repeat-dealing relationship is established, B will
want to remain in it and will therefore let S slowly recoup his ini-
tial investment."°5 S's confidence that B will behave this way is
rational because the early rounds of any contracting relationship
are costly to B even though she is paying only the customary
price and may, in fact, be receiving higher than customary qual-
ity. Because quality is important to B, during these initial trans-
actions she may have to deal with multiple suppliers to ensure
that she will have the requisite amount of a particular quality of
the commodity on hand. Alternatively, she may have to keep suf-
ficient inventory on hand to cover her needs in case the new S
delivers towards the low end of the customary range.
The information transactors learn about one another's busi-
nesses in these early dealings gradually reduces the coordination
and performance costs of dealing with one another," giving rise
to switching costs for both B and S. Once the relationship is es-
tablished, both transactors therefore have a reason to want to
maintain it.'
'During these early rounds of the transactional relationship, the weak-form custom
also provides benefits to S. In its absence, and in the absence of any other agreed range, S
would take even more precautions to ensure that performance was exactly as promised,
fearful that B would interpret any deviation as breach that would trigger a retaliatory re-
sponse. However, in addition to giving B a way to ascertain that the deviation was un-
likely to be a defection, the custom also constrains her behavior. When B rejects goods
that are within customarily acceptable ranges, S can threaten to impose multilateral
reputational sanctions-publicizing B's action to market transactors who would likely
agree that B's action was improper. Indeed in the cotton industry, mills that acquire a
reputation for being very inflexible on quality deviations find that they have to pay more
for goods than do mills with a reputation for flexibility. See, for example, Interview with
Cotton Merchant (date unavailable) (on file with author) ("Mills get a reputation about
how flexible they are when certain circumstances arise [and] a merchant considers this
very valuable business knowledge, this information about how flexible a mill will be. Some
mills are more stringent about adjustments, and are very strict about demanding exact
conformity to the contract. These mills have to pay more for cotton than mills who are
willing to be more flexible. The market knows."). Conversely, when B accepts goods in the
customary range even though they are not exactly what she wants, S is not going to inter-
pret this as acquiescence that lower quality delivery is "acceptable." However, the Code
provisions that permit contract modification by course of dealing or course of performance
endorse just such an interpretation of the action.
'This initial sacrifice by S can be thought of simply as a relationship-specific invest-
ment that will be amortized over time.
'See note 200.
""Alternatively, even in the absence of either weak-form custom or good reputation in-
formation, cooperation could emerge if a buyer and seller had a common view of the distri-
bution of outcomes (where an outcome is an actual completed aspect of the promised per-
formance) after an agreed-upon level of precaution had been taken. In such a situation,
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Once B and S establish a relationship-specific CD zone, and
the contract price adjusts both to reflect it and to permit S to re-
coup his initial investment, if S's performance is within this zone
it will be considered cooperation, and if it is outside this zone, or
outside of the zone on several occasions, it will be considered de-
fection. At this stage of B and S's contracting relationship there
are two kinds of defection: defection that is outside the CD zone
but within customary range and defection that is outside even the
customary range.
Defection that is outside the private CD zone but within the
customary range may, if it is a nonregular occurrence, call for a
price adjustment on the next deal, or some other measured re-
sponse such as not dealing for a few rounds. Although the CD
zone is narrower than the customary range, making more out-
comes defection, a CD relationship is actually less vulnerable to
breakdown than a customary one. Because transactors in a CD
relationship are relatively well-informed about one another's op-
erations, they can more accurately infer whether the other coop-
erated or defected than can transactors in the early and custom-
ary stage of their relationship. As a consequence, transactors' re-
sponses to outcomes just outside of a well-established CD zone
are more tempered. This intuition is reflected in the grain poem
"If I Knew You and You Knew Me":
If I knew you and you knew me
'Tis seldom we would disagree;
But never having yet clasped hands,
Both often fail to understand
That each intends to do what's right
And treat each other "honor bright."
How little to complain there'd be
If I knew you and you knew me.
outcomes within the agreed zone of error, or perhaps within two standard deviations of its
mean, would be considered cooperation. Outcomes outside the zone, or repeated outcomes
outside the zone, would be considered defection. More specifically, if transactors had a
common understanding of the error ranges associated with each aspect of performance af-
ter optimal precautions had been taken, if the Code were to define customary ranges in
terms of these random errors, and if courts too could make these determinations with rea-
sonable accuracy at reasonable cost, enforcing this "custom" as a term of the contract
would be value creating. It might remove the incentive for S to engage in too high a level
of precaution early in the relationship when a random but large deviation is most costly to
the relationship (either because the relationship-specific background to assess it has not
yet developed, or because it is one of a fewer number of data points on behavior and so will
have larger influence on the transactors' assessments of one another's behavior than
would a later deviation) and will effectively constrain opportunism by both B and S. In
such a regime, S might try to be opportunistic by consistently delivering to the low end of
the range, but if he did so B could terminate the relationship.
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When'er we ship you by mistake,
Or in your bill some error make,
From irritation you'd be free
If I knew you and you knew me.
Or when the checks don't come on time
And customers send nary a line,
We'd wait without anxiety,
If I knew you and you knew me."°
In most industries, merchant transactors' responses to particular
breaches do depend strongly on the identity of and their prior re-
lationship with the breaching party.'
In contrast, defection outside the customary range, such as
either a delivery or a series of deliveries outside the customary
range, is likely to signal defection and to trigger an endgame
round-that is, termination or suspension of the relationship and
a resort to arbitration to recover money damages.210 Moreover, be-
12 WWGT 35 (June 20, 1922-23).
'NHA, Report of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Convention 55 (1920) ("We have noted
instances of where a shipper would invoice a car as being No. 2 timothy, when as a matter
of fact there might be some 'off grade hay. However, the receiver knowing the shipper and
of the conditions under which the hay was bought and loaded, knew that there would be
no trouble over the invoicing as he knew the shipper was not trying to slip something over
on him. Hence the value of personal relationship between buyer and seller. In other in-
stances this practice causes a lot of trouble."). See also email from participant in the Cot-
ton-L List Serve (One cotton transactor explained that if a transactor asks to be released
from a contract "you have to look at the circumstances for not providing the cotton (no
prices going from 70 to 80 is not acceptable). A disaster is a disaster. Who you are dealing
with is also important, for both sides. Have you been selling your cotton to this guy for 10
years.") (email on file with author).
0°Although it is difficult to establish whether or not a dispute is an endgame dispute,
in part because even if two agents never deal again, their companies might still choose to
do so, there is nonetheless evidence that in some merchant tribunals most cases are end-
game disputes. For example, between 1975 and 1996, 54 percent of the cases heard by the
Board of Appeals, the tribunal that resolves disputes between cotton merchants and cot-
ton mills, were absolute endgame disputes. The most common triggers of the endgame
were the insolvency or financial distress of a party or the closing of a cotton office, and the
second most common were a change of control of one of the entities involved or the retire-
ment of a person directly involved in the transaction, both events that upset settled expec-
tations. Another 18 percent of the cases involved disputes that might fairly be classified as
endgame. They involved the effects of a government subsidy program that made large
sums turn on who had possession of cotton on a particular day. These cases were ones in
which an event took the contract out of the self-enforcing range and made it worthwhile
for one of the parties to end their contracting relationship. The remaining 27 percent of
the cases involved primarily factual disputes about late payment and late delivery. Trans-
actors explained that if they had to take a case to the Board of Appeals they would be
quite unlikely to deal with the other party again. Bernstein, Private Commercial Law at
46-47 (cited in note 13). See also NHA, Report of the Twenty-Fifth Annual Convention 126
(1918) (stating that the arbitration report notes that "once a case is brought to the atten-
tion of the Arbitration Committee, the parties concerned will no longer have the confi-
dence in each other. Their difference begets contradiction, contradiction begets heat, and
heat rises into rage and ill-will. Then all human judgment is laid aside and men no longer
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cause most market participants know the loose contours of the
customary range, defections outside of it can also be sanctioned
through multilateral reputational sanctions. These sanctions are
only available when a significant number of market transactors
agree that an outcome, or a series of outcomes, is defection and
when the defection or defections are either observable to many
market participants or can be credibly revealed to them at a rea-
sonable cost by the breached-against party.
211
As each transactor comes to know the other's business and
switching costs increase, making defection more costly, the CD
zone becomes increasingly stable and the weak-form customs that
initially provided useful relationship-creating norms diminish in
importance. Once this occurs, the transactors can begin to de-
velop value-creating, relationship-specific, relationship-preserv-
ing norms ("RPNs") that may (or may not) depart from industry
practice, the transactors' written contracts, and, in the trade as-
sociation context, the default provisions supplied by trade rules.
Sometimes these RPNs may be explicit extralegal agree-
ments that contradict the contract's terms. An example is an
agreement not to demand the federally supervised weights re-
quired by most feed contracts, but instead to rely on one another's
in-house weights, typically splitting any differences that may
arise until opportunism is suspected and one transactor reverts to
demanding compliance with the contract.21 In a similar vein, one
lumber dealer explained:
Of course, we all know that many small adjustments are
made every day, where allowances asked are not unreason-
able and where the salesman can verify the customers con-
tention, but when it looks as the 'something was being
slipped over' or where the mill will not agree to any allow-
ance, THEN IS THE TIME TO DEMAND OFFICIAL IN-
SPECTION ACCORDING TO THE TERMS under which
THE LUMBER WAS SOLD. 213
consider their business transactions as sacred").
"'Although the sanction for a breach that falls outside of the customary range is
larger than it would be in a world with no rough consensus as to the parameters of the
range, it is not clear that deterrence will necessarily be too high. In the repeat-play con-
text, this hybrid legal and reputational sanction is not usually imposed for any one devia-
tion but rather for several. It is therefore likely to be imposed less often and more accu-
rately than the standard monetary remedy for breach.
"'See Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1793 n 96 (cited in note 13).
PCSA, The Secretary's Weekly Letter No 43 (Oct 4, 1911). See also Fagg & Taylor v
S.F. Scattergood & Co (NGFA 1912), reprinted in Decisions of the Arbitration and Appeals
Committees at 74-75 (cited in note 49) (in a case where the acceptability of particular
routing was at issue, the defendant "acknowledges that he has used [that is, accepted] this
19991
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Other times, RPNs may be variants of the contract's explicit
provisions that add flexibility by defining acceptable ranges of
performance. Alternatively, RPNs may recast the contract's ex-
plicit provisions, which may condition on information that is veri-
fiable but not observable,214 into extralegal understandings that
impose approximately the same obligations but condition only on
information that is observable to both transactors.
In repeat-play contracting relationships in particular, provi-
sions that condition only on information that is either observable
or both observable and verifiable are more likely to successfully
maintain cooperation than provisions that condition on informa-
tion that is verifiable but not observable. When transactors bar-
gain in the shadow of information that is only verifiable, in the
absence of the requirement of full disclosure required by the dis-
covery rules, it is often difficult-if not either impossible or pro-
hibitively costly-for transactors to credibly reveal to one another
the information necessary for a cooperative adjustment to be
reached. It may therefore be difficult for transactors to recognize
the parameters of the zone of agreement, thereby increasing the
risk of cooperative breakdown. Although most of the economics
literature discusses information that is observable but not verifi-
able, or information that is both observable and verifiable, in le-
gal settings one of the most important types of information is in-
formation that is verifiable but not observable. The rules of civil
discovery would make no sense if this latter category were not of
primary importance in defining legal relations and deciding
cases.
Consider, for example, a contract provision calling for the
payment of fully compensatory expectation damages in the event
of breach. Suppose that S inadvertently breaches the contract
and, in a cooperative vein, immediately offers to pay B full expec-
tation damages. In many contexts, to make B truly whole this
measure would have to include lost profits, which must be calcu-
lated by reference to both expected revenue and expected costs.
While B might be able to credibly reveal his expected revenues,
perhaps by showing S written orders he will be unable to fill, B
cannot credibly reveal his costs. The lower B's alleged costs, the
routing on similar contracts, but states that he only did so because it did not cause him
loss or inconvenience, and further that it is their custom to ignore breaches of the contract
where they are not inconvenienced," explaining that they "seldom pay any attention to
technicalities ... [that] do not cost us anything... but where a shipper does not fulfill his
contract and the amount involved is sufficient to warrant our insisting upon a shipper ful-
filling a contract we do not feel we should be called technical").
s" See notes 184 (defining observable) and 185 (defining verifiable).
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greater his recoverable damages. S therefore has no reason to be-
lieve that B has accurately revealed all of his costs.215 In the ab-
sence of even the weak threat of discovery sanctions for incom-
plete information revelation, B's revelations will not be credible.
This uncertainty may give rise to suspicion and may lead the par-
ties to have different views of the settlement zone. In contrast,
had the contract called for damages in the amount of the differ-
ence between the contract and the market price, the zone of
agreement would be clear and, because the breach was inadver-
tent, cooperation would more likely be restored.
More generally, because most efficient customary norms and
the relationship-specific RPNs that give rise to them will not con-
dition on information that is only verifiable, and may condition on
information that is observable but not verifiable, customary
norms are unlikely to be the optimal rules for a tribunal to apply
in the event of a dispute. And, if transactors knew, as they would
if their contract were governed by the Code, that any relation-
ship-specific RPN followed more than once may be transformed
into a legally enforceable obligation in the event of a dispute, they
would be far less willing to diverge from the terms of their writ-
ten agreement, even in situations where doing so is highly benefi-
cial to one transactor and costless to the other.
Understanding these and other reasons" why the optimal
norms to govern a relationship are likely to differ at different
'" These costs may also be very complicated to prorate to a specific contract. Moreover,
B may hesitate to reveal them since the next time B and S negotiate a deal, S will be able
to more accurately assess B's reservation price.
216For example, in markets where most transactions are between transactors with
long-term, repeat-dealing relationships with one another, if those customary RPNs that do
exist emerge from pair-wise sets of transactors choosing independently to follow them as
parts of established courses of dealing, it is likely that these RPNs will be relatively well-
suited to mature, long-standing transactional relationships but relatively ill-suited to new
contractual relationships where trust has not yet been established and the transactors
have minimal information about one another's business operations. As a consequence,
courts looking to these customary norms to interpret contracts made in early stages of re-
lationships will be imposing obligations the transactors did not, and would not, have vol-
untarily assumed. In addition, because it will be easier to prove to a court those prior in-
stances where a practice was followed than it will be to prove that a precondition failed to
occur so a practice was not followed, court interpretations of custom are likely to leave out
important preconditions. Perhaps the most important such precondition is the degree of
trust (defined here to mean a transactor's perception of the likelihood that the other
transactor will act opportunistically if unconstrained by a legal or nonlegal sanction) the
transactors have in one another. The types of norms one would agree to be governed by if
dealing with an angel are quite different from the types of norms one would agree to be
governed by if dealing with a scoundrel; yet the ability of courts to distinguish between
angels and scoundrels is, on the margin, quite limited.
For a discussion of additional reasons why one would expect both actual and optimal
relationship-preserving customary norms to differ from optimal legally enforceable con-
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stages of a contracting relationship, and recognizing that rela-
tionship-creating and relationship-preserving norms are likely to
differ in content and structure from the optimal endgame norms
for a tribunal to apply in the event of a dispute, makes it easier to
understand why merchants do not want either their relationship-
specific courses of performance and courses of dealing217 or their
every-day customary practices-like granting price adjustments
for nonconforming tender-incorporated or written into the
law.21
8
It is, however, difficult to empirically verify that weak-form
customs are in fact useful relationship-creating norms and are
being used to initiate repeat-dealing relationships. Nevertheless,
as demonstrated earlier, transactors attach a great deal of impor-
tance to their prior dealings with a transactor in deciding how to
respond to different situations that may arise, 219 and there is
some evidence that transactors view the early stages of a rela-
tionship as a time to learn about one another's reputation, reli-
ability, and business practices. 2"° In the cotton industry, for ex-
tract provisions, see Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1796-1815 (cited in note 13).
"'For example, the Trading Rules of the National Cottonseed Products Association,
Inc (I NCPAW) prohibit arbitrators from enforcing "terms or conditions not expressly pro-
vided for in these Rules," except where such variant terms are explicitly permitted by the
rules. NCPA Rules Rule I at 34 (NCPA 1994-95). See also Interview with Association Ex-
ecutive (July 1996) (on file with author). This approach is also adopted by the American
Spice Trade Association, whose arbitration board excludes contextual considerations and
only hears cases based on breach of unmodified association-drafted standard form con-
tracts. Interview with Association Executive (June 1996) (on file with author). Similarly,
preliminary research suggests that arbitrators at the Green Coffee Association of New
York are strictly unwilling to look to course of performance or unwritten custom of trade.
Interview with Arbitrator (Apr 16, 1998) (conducted by Drew Porter, on file with author)
(noting they do not look to custom); Interview with Arbitrator (Apr 15, 1998) (conducted by
Drew Porter, on file with author) (noting that arbitrators don't look to conduct in inter-
preting a contract and stating that any variation from the contract would be subject to ap-
proval by both parties, and any decision to depart from the contract would require some
sort of written proof for arbitrators to take it seriously); Interview with Arbitrators (Apr
14, 1998) (conducted by Drew Porter, on file with author) (telling the interviewer there are
no unwritten customs). The Association of Food Industries, however, has adopted a
slightly less formalistic approach. If a contract is silent, arbitrators look to custom and
will give contractual language its'ordinary meaning in the trade. However, they do not
permit custom to override explicit contractual provisions and will not take courses of per-
formance or courses of dealing at odds with contractual language into account in deciding
cases. Interview with Arbitrator (Feb 1997) (on file with author).
... See note 172 and accompanying text.
'. See notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
'See Heggblade-Marguleas-Tenneco, Inc v Sunshine Biscuit, Inc, 59 Cal App 3d 948,
131 Cal Rptr 183, 185-86 (1976) (recounting seller's statements that it would "overplant 'a
little bit! since this would be their first contract and they wanted to be sure they could
produce the quantity needed," and the sellers "have picked our best land.., for we want
to be sure to effect the best delivery possible"; also quoting from a letter from the buyer
stating that "we would like to start with you on the basis of obtaining 100,000 sacks of
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ample, where mill-buyers consider the reputation of merchant-
sellers to be very important, most mills consider their own past
experience dealing with a merchant to be one of the most impor-
tant sources of reputation information.22' Mill-buyers explain that
to learn about reputation they will typically start with a "lower
quantity deal with an intermediate price," and then see what
happens; "if [the merchants] are bad," or "fuss at them a lot,"
then they won't deal with the person again.2 22
Caveat. This account of the emergence of repeat-dealing rela-
tionships, though plausible, is also subject to empirical challenge.
In markets where buyers and sellers play fixed roles in the chain
of production and distribution, buyers as a group and sellers as a
group sometimes have divergent views about the content of these
aggregate market practices." These divergences may, in fact, be
Kennebec potatoes from your operation.. . . This arrangement would balance our needs
with the opportunity for you to perform directly for us and evaluate our relationship. At
the same time, it would enable us to do what we have always done in the past-maintain
our loyalty to those who have served us well in the past").
"'When ten mills were asked how they obtained information about the reputation of
merchant-sellers, nine mentioned their own past experience with the merchant as a sig-
nificant source of information, though, as one noted, this method of obtaining information
taught "hard lessons." Mill Questionnaire No 2 (no date available); id ("my own experi-
ence"); Mill Questionnaire No 3 (July 28, 1997) ("trade"); Mill Questionnaire No 4 (Aug 6,
1997) ("experience mostly"); Mill Questionnaire No 5 (Aug 8, 1997) ("past experience");
Mill Questionnaire No 6 (July 30, 1997) ("experience"); Mill Questionnaire No 7 (July 31,
1997) ("from prior dealing with him"); Mill Questionnaire No 8 (July 29, 1997) ("personal
experience"); Mill Questionnaire No 9 (July 29, 1997) ("By doing business with him."); Mill
Questionnaire No 10 (July 28, 1997) (by looking at "our past experience with him"). All
Mill Questionnaires are on file with author. Mills explain that they also obtain informa-
tion about reputation from other sources including gossip, the trade press, and their bank-
ers.
=Mill Questionnaire No 1 (Oct 7, 1997) (on file with author). Merchants also consider
past dealings with a particular mill important to evaluating the mill's reputation, but be-
cause there are many fewer mills than merchants, they tend to rely more on the "word on
the street," specifically Front Street in Memphis, for their information. Yet they too rely
on their own experience to assess reputation; but as one warned, "if you have never dealt
with the other party before, deal in small quantities." Interview with Merchant (no date
available) (on file with author).
'See, for example, Bureau of Trade Relations, National Retail Dry Goods Association
("NRDGA') and SAA, Survey of Trade Practices in the Silk Trade 10 (NRDGA & SAA
1944) ("Retailers report that the average length of time usually consumed in making re-
turns is approximately four days although a substantial number of replies indicate that
from seven to ten days is the amount of time usually required.... From the manufac-
turer's viewpoint, [however,] replies indicate that the usual length of time consumed by
the retailer in making returns is seventeen days .... Both the manufacturers' and retail-
ers' replies to this question [about return times] vary from less than one day to thirty
days."). See also Note, 61 Yale L J at 702 (cited in note 85) (noting that in the early rayon
industry, "trade customs, which are understood and in part written, have not been ac-
cepted by both buyers and sellers.... there is no uniformity").
It is also important to note that in some industries, such as textiles, certain defini-
tions of quality, like "Seconds" and "first quality," are not even defined in market, re-
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wide enough to impede the emergence of repeat-dealing relation-
ships. However, even in the absence of consensus on the customs
relating to all or most aspects of a transaction, cooperation may
still arise if there is a common view of the practices relating to a
few, preferably core, aspects of trade. If the signal sent with re-
spect to these issues is strong enough, transactors will likely be
more flexible in dealing with other aspects of trade that contra-
dict their expectations because they will have greater confidence
that their transacting partner is not a defector.
Perhaps more importantly, however, many merchant indus-
tries, particularly those with private legal systems, are charac-
terized by institutional rules and features,224 as well as a variety
of contracting practices, that can best be understood as promoting
the emergence and endurance of the type of common knowledge
that is important to the development of repeat-dealing relation-
ships. The adoption of trade rules might, for example, be under-
stood as an effort to explicitly create this type of common knowl-
edge." Some of these rules explicitly set out acceptable ranges of
contractual performance,2  while others provide focal points
around which acceptable ranges of outcomes could arise. As one
drafter of the 1986 revisions to the WSRs explained, "The rules
provide two businessmen a way to settle an argument by getting
gional, or local terms. Rather they are defined in terms of the past output of a particular
mill. See Definitions and Trade Customs, WSR 32 (1936).
"In some industries, social conditions or past social conditions may also have sup-
ported the emergence of commercial relationships, not only by making the fact of defection
more observable to market participants through gossip networks that were well-
established to meet other needs, such as detecting religious deviance, but also through
strong interpersonal relationships that transcended business dealings. These types of
forces served to increase the reputation bond posted in each transaction and to promote
common understanding. In the cotton industry, this function was served by the culture of
honor in the Old South and encouraged by groups like the Cotton Wives Club of the Mem-
phis Cotton Exchange. In the diamond industry, it was served by the close-knit nature of
Orthodox Jewish Society. See Bernstein, 21 J Legal Stud at 130 (cited in note 173). In the
textile industry, closeness was fostered by geographical proximity, see Textile History at 1
(cited in note 83), and social events, some of which, like the textile follies, a musical lam-
poon, continue to the present day. See Textile Distributors, 155 Women's Wear Daily No
101 at S 36 (May 24, 1988).
'Interestingly, codified local customs can also promote cooperation even between
transactors in different locations with conflicting codified customs. Suppose that S prom-
ises to deliver lumber "promptly" and does so within ten days. If "prompt" in the B's local-
ity means five days, he might classify the delivery as defection if the term is not defined
either orally or in the contract. If, however, B makes his objection and the reason for it
known to S, and S shows him a Trade Rule from her locality defining prompt as twelve
days, B will likely classify S's action as cooperation and simply negotiate a more specific
clause in the future, rather than treat the delay as defection and terminate the relation-
ship. If, however, the twelve day practice were unwritten, S's claim would be far less plau-
sible and relationship breakdown would more likely follow.
"See note 187.
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insight into what other businessmen think is standard."2" Today,
some trade rules have themselves come to be considered the cus-
toms of the trade.2"
Moreover, association-sponsored educational efforts to pro-
mote knowledge of both trade rules and the content of work-a-day
business practices were far reaching, and even today the cotton
industry sponsors an introductory nine week course, at Rhodes
College that includes instruction in 'the ethical implications of
contracts, contract law, and the importance of contract sanctity;
... typical trade terms and conditions in the various markets; ...
[and] international trading rules."" Similarly, the NGFA spon-
sors trade rules seminars in which participants study the trade
rules, read arbitration opinions, work through hypothetical
trading situations, and listen to speeches about trade ethics and
proper trading practices.' In most industries these efforts are
and were complemented by extraordinarily active trade presses.
The opinions issued by merchant arbitrators also serve to
promote common knowledge. Although no merchant-run arbitra-
tion tribunals give formal precedential weight to their prior deci-
sions, the tribunals discussed here, along with many others,
nonetheless produced, published, and widely disseminated arbi-
tration opinions. Although these opinions served a variety of
functions,2 1 perhaps the most important was to educate members
'Palmieri, Lawyers Group Publishes Revision, 16 Daily News Rec at 9 (cited in note
84).
" 'See text accompanying note 102 (noting that the WSRs have become custom); Arbi-
tration Practice Upheld, 3 Silkworm 137-38 (July 1921) (noting that "practically all raw
silk is sold under and pursuant to these rules, so that they have come to bear the dignity
of a trade custom").
'Rhodes College Web Site, <http://www.meeman.rhodes.edufinstitutes/cotton.
curriculum.html> (visited Apr 22, 1999).
"'Similar seminars are run by the Texas Grain and Feed Association. See Nuts and
Bolts of the Grain Trade (flyer describing seminar on contracts, trade rules, customs, and
arbitration, including panel on "Customs of Trade," "Contract Law," "Arbitration," and
"Trade Rules"). See also Trade Rules as Amended at Des Moines Meeting, 13 WWGT 26
(Nov 20, 1923-24) ("[Fjrom the standpoint of education it can with truth be said that the
annual trade rules article is about as valuable a contribution as could be made to the
members through their official organ.").
"'Opinions were viewed as a way of improving the quality of arbitral decisions by
forcing arbitrators to articulate reasons for their award. They were also a useful, albeit
imperfect, check on certain types of arbitral bias. An arbitrator who signed his name to a
widely circulated opinion that was perceived to be biased risked reputational harm and
damage to his own business. In addition, especially in the early days, the production of
well-reasoned opinions was one of the ways that the association-run tribunals attempted
to establish their own legitimacy. In industries that published the names of the disputing
parties in the opinions, the prospect that an opinion would be written was a way of en-
couraging settlement. Opinions often noted that even the prevailing party acted improp-
erly, Cook Industries v Tripple "F' Feeds, NGFA App Case No 1532 (1977) (affirming the
primary arbitration panel's judgment against the defendant while noting that the "Arbi-
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of the trade about the content of the rules and the contours of
proper business practices," a function that is still regarded as
important today.' The interpretation and discussion of these
opinions in the industry-sponsored trade press furthered and con-
tinues to further this norm-inculcation effort.
The membership rules of these associations also facilitate
this method of establishing relationships. Most associations have
substantial membership fees' and strict membership require-
ments, permitting just a few dissenting votes to block a candi-
date's admission.' As a consequence, a transactor who behaved
tration Appeals Committee observes regretfully that both parties to this transaction left
much to be desired in preparation and performance of the contract"), thereby giving both
parties a reason to settle. See N-A, Report of the Second Annual Meeting 16 (1895) (sug-
gesting that because the Kansas City Hay Association has its opinions "published in the
press ... the result has been that today we do not have any complaints in Kansas City be-
tween shippers and receivers").
'See, for example, the excerpt from the report of C.F. Kraemer, Chairman of the
NAWLA Arbitration Committee, in Convention "Highlights", 3 Service 1 (May 26, 1930)
(NAWLA arbitration opinions help "to avoid repetition of disputes through the more care-
ful handling of situations likely to develop into controversies.... we all profit by our mis-:
takes of the past and when it is pointed out to us where we have erred either by neglecting
to folly protect ourselves in the original contract or through some oversight and careless
attention to conditions arising subsequent to the contract, we can certainly be careful to
guard against repetition. That, we conceive, to be one of the important functions of Arbi-
tration."). See also SAA, Fifty-Fifth Annual Report 35 (1926-27) ("Arbitration has been
helpful .... It has been found to clarify, in the thought of the trade, the ethics of a situa-
tion; and has also, to a certain degree, taught the application of official trade practices as
compiled by the several Association divisions.").
Although merchant arbitrators tended to decide the cases strictly on the basis of Trade
Rules and written contracts, in many industries their opinions sometimes note that the
prevailing party nonetheless engaged in unacceptable business practices. See, for exam-
ple, Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1775-76, 1818-19 (cited in note 13). In addition, while
none of the trade rules studied imposed a general duty of good faith and fair dealing, and
it was quite rare for arbitrators to take good faith into account, see Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law at 10 n 42 (cited in note 13) (reporting that at the Memphis Cotton Ex-
change only three of the opinions written from 1944-90 mentioned good faith), opinions
sometimes noted that one party (sometimes even the prevailing party) or both parties
acted in bad faith.
'The NGFA, for example, whose contemporary opinions are among the most detailed
and comprehensive published, takes the position that
most importantly, the [arbitration] decisions serve as an educational tool for the in-
dustry by communicating how particular disputes have been resolved. While arbitra-
tion decisions are not formal precedent as to subsequent disputes, they are especially
instructive to the membership because arbitration cases often involve issues faced by
others on a daily basis.
Gordon, A Century ofAgricultural Abundance at 57 (cited in note 56).
'See, for example, Interview with Southern Cotton Association Executive (1996)
(noting that dues and fees can, depending on the size of the firm, be well over $10,000 per
year).
'Southern Cotton Association, By-Laws & Trade Rules Art 2, §§ 1-2 (requiring that
membership candidates be nominated by five members of the association, that all mem-
bers be given opportunity to object, that two-thirds approval of the Committee on Mem-
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badly in previous deals with an association member is unlikely to
be admitted. In addition, by joining an association, a transactor
implicitly binds himself to make more aspects of his commercial
behavior observable to market participants. For example, most
associations require members to arbitrate all disputes with other
members in the association's own tribunals and have a variety of
ways of making the outcomes of cases quickly known to associa-
tion members. Moreover, members who either refuse to arbitrate
or who do not comply with an award are usually either suspended
or expelled from the association and will typically have their
names posted on the exchange floor' and/or mentioned in the as-
sociation's newsletter along with a description of their wrongdo-
ing.' In most industries these sanctions are severe. Transactors
are quite reluctant to deal with someone who has been expelled
from an industry association, so these sanctions sometimes put
the offending transactor entirely out of business.' The existence
of these rules and procedures turns membership into a credible
signal that a transactor has a low discount rate since seeking
membership, and thereby opening up his future dealings to more
exacting scrutiny, would be irrational if he did not.
Finally, contracting practices both in merchant industries
governed by private legal systems as well as in those governed by
the Code might also play a role in enhancing cooperation. Buyers'
and sellers' confirmations often include terms not found in the
others' confirmations. These additional terms are often unen-
forceable under the Code 9 and may not be enforceable under
many industries' approaches to the "battle of the forms." The
standard explanation for these terms is that each transactor
hopes that the other will either not know the terms are unen-
forceable or that he will not risk violating them since he does not
have the financial resources to defend himself if they are liti-
gated. Yet these additional terms can also be understood as set-
ting the terms that the other transactor must comply with if he
wants the contracting relationship to continue. In some indus-
bership be obtained, and that two-thirds of the Board of Directors vote in favor). See also
Interview with Association Executive (June 1996) (a few objecting members block admis-
sion).
'See Bernstein, 21 J Legal Stud at 138-43 (cited in note 173) (discussing diamond in-
dustry nonlegal sanctions).
See, for example, Ten Cases Cleaned Up: Arbitration Committees Decide Six Dis-
putes-Two Are Settled Direct and Two are Expelled, 10 WWGT 39, 40 (Dec 5, 1920-21)
(listing the names of those expelled from the association for failure to arbitrate or failure
to pay an arbitration award).
'See Bernstein, 21 J Legal Stud at 141 (cited in note 173).
-'UCC § 2-207.
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tries, these terms are supplied not in fine print on contracts, but
on posters at the buyer's place of business or in manuals or cir-
culars the buyer produces and distributes to his suppliers. The
terms are, in effect, providing a more efficient substitute for
common knowledge as to the ranges of practices considered ac-
ceptable. These additional terms are really saying to sellers, "It is
all well and good for you to comply with the contract, that pro-
tects you from suit, but if you want to get repeat business from
us, these are the terms you must meet."
Conclusion
In sum, weak-form customs are neither optimal endgame
norms nor, for the most part, optimal RPNs. Rather, they may,
under certain conditions, and at certain stages of market devel-
opment, provide transactors with a set of imperfect, yet nonethe-
less workable, relationship-creating norms. The availability of
these norms-particularly as enhanced by trade rules and other
institutional features of trade association-run private legal sys-
tems-is particularly important in markets where reputation in-
formation is not, standing alone, sufficient either to support ex-
change between strangers and/or to induce traders to seek the op-
timal number of transactional partners. More generally, the di-
vergence between the endgame provisions contained in trade
rules and written contracts, on the one hand, and the relation-
ship-creating and relationship-preserving norms that transactors
follow in their work-a-day interactions, on the other, together
with the acontextual approach of most merchant tribunals, en-
ables transactors in many industries governed by merchant-run
private legal systems to capture the benefits not only of repeat
dealing but also of contracting under a dual set of legally unen-
forceable relationship-preserving norms and legally enforceable
endgame norms, each better adapted to the situations they are
designed to govern than either would be to governing the domain
of the contracting relationship as a whole. In short, this alterna-
tive account of the important role played by weak-form customs
in commercial relationships does not depend on courts or other
third-party arbiters looking to custom to fill contractual gaps or
interpret the meaning of contractual provisions; yet it helps to
explain why merchants consider an understanding of customs, at
least weak-form commercial customs, to be central to the conduct
of successful business operations.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article has been to raise, though by no
means resolve, questions relating to the desirability of the Code's
incorporation strategy. It has presented evidence that the Code's
conception of widely known commercial standards and usages
that are geographically coextensive with the scope of trade does
not correspond to merchant reality but rather is a legal fiction
whose usefulness and desirability needs to be demonstrated and
defended rather than assumed. Although arguments might be
developed to justify the use of this legal fiction as a second-best
type solution to problems of gap filling and interpretation in
commercial law, nothing in the legislative history of the Code, or
the scholarly literature on commercial law, has yet put forth an
adequate justification for the Code's and the Permanent Editorial
Board's broad endorsement of the incorporation strategy.
Indeed, developing a justification for the Code's approach
would require separate consideration of the wide variety of ways
in which incorporation influences commercial adjudication and,
perhaps more importantly, ex ante contracting practices. In addi-
tion, given the highly local nature of most customs that do exist,
any attempt to rehabilitate the incorporation strategy would have
to be accompanied by the development of complex and explicit
choice of custom rules. It would also have to take into account the
fact that, as a practical matter, the incorporation strategy is
closer to the pole of a mandatory, rather than a default, adjudica-
tive approach, and that the consequences of the approach vary
widely in its different and varied uses. For example, the Code's
use of "commercial standards" in determining whether a contract
is definite enough to warrant legal enforcement240 might reinforce
the undesirable tendency of merchants to underspecify their con-
tracts, a tendency that even today merchant associations actively
try to combat.24' Conversely, the Code provision specifying that
when no time is given for an action to be taken under a contract a
"reasonable time" is to be implied242 may be less problematic. The
cost to transactors of specifying time frames for important as-
pects of contractual performance in the boilerplate on their con-
firmations is quite low and might, in fact, be the type of practice
'-Id at § 2-204 cmt.
. See NGFA, Protecting Your Company's Interest in Agricultural Commodities 13-16,
19, 30 (1995) (discussing the importance of entering into well-specified contracts and urg-
ing transactors to do so). See also sources cited in note 48 (discussing the tendency of hay
dealers to underspecify their contracts).
"'UCC § 2-309.
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we want to encourage through a "penalty default" type of incen-
tive.243
The battle of the forms situation, in contrast, is one where
the Code's incorporation strategy is problematic, especially if the
Hayekian view of custom is incorrect and some customs, while
not quite rising to the level of customs of adhesion, nevertheless
favor certain types of transactors. Under the Code, trade usage is
an important consideration in determining whether additional
terms in a confirmation "materially alter 244 the offer and are
therefore unenforceable or whether they fail to do so and are
therefore enforceable unless either the offer limits acceptance to
its terms or the inclusion of additional terms amounts to "sur-
prise or hardship."245 If customs favor the stronger party, but do
'A penalty default rule is a rule that is deliberately given content that many or a
majority of transactors do not like, in an effort to induce them to reveal information and/or
to adopt a provision better suited to their transactions. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk and Ste-
ven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J L Econ & Org 284 (1991); Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87
(1989). If, however, courts then vary the meaning of explicit timing provisions by reference
to industry practice, the benefits of inducing explicit contracting might not be attainable
under existing doctrine. Although it has been suggested that the incorporation strategy it-
self might be an effective penalty default, inducing industries that would benefit from a
more formalistic adjudicative approach to opt out and create private legal systems, it is
important to note that the conditions that make opt out desirable, and the preconditions
necessary to overcome collective action problems and make opt out possible, are quite dif-
ferent. As a consequence, industries that might prefer a more formalistic adjudicative ap-
proach may not be able to opt out of the Code.
'UCC § 2-207(2)(b) & cmts 3-5. See, for example, Avedon Engineering, Inc v Seatex,
126 F3d 1279, 1284-85 (10th Cir 1997) (in deciding whether an arbitration provision in an
unsigned textile sales confirmation form was a "material alteration" under UCC § 2-207
(which would render it unenforceable), the court looked to see whether the inclusion of an
arbitration clause was customary in the trade, explaining that if it was the provision, it
would be enforceable); Suzy Phillips Originals, Inc v Coville, Inc, 939 F Supp 1012, 1017-
19 (E D NY 1996) (finding a limitation of liability clause in the seller's confirmation to be
"standard trade practice," as evidenced by the WSRs, the court held that it therefore nei-
ther materially altered the terms of the offer nor inflicted "unreasonable surprise"), affd,
125 F3d 845 (2d Cir 1997); Graphics v Peck Industries, Inc, 304 SC 101, 403 SE2d 146, 150
(SC App 1991) (same).
2 UCC § 2-207 cmt 4. See also Wilson Fertilizer & Grain, Inc v ADM Milling Co, 654
NE2d 848, 852-54 (Ind App 1995). In holding that an arbitration provision in buyer's order
did not materially alter the offer so as to render the arbitration provision unenforceable,
the court explained that the Code's
Comments suggest that hardship or surprise may be created by terms that deviate
from customary trade standards and practices, but may not be created by terms that
operate within the accepted norms of the parties' particular trade. * ** W]hile evi-
dence of usage of trade and course of dealings are not conclusive on the question of
surprise... such proof is significant to the issue. * * * In short, a party should not be
surprised to find in a confirmation a clause of a type that is customarily used within
the trade, whereas the clause is an unreasonable surprise where it represents an un-
reasonable or harsh deviation from custom.
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not rise to the level of imposing a hardship and are not uncon-
scionable, they will be enforced. This gives large firms, who will
also have better resources to hire experts, the ability to get a sig-
nificant contracting advantage.246
Determining the desirability of other Code provisions that
rely on incorporation is somewhat more complicated. For exam-
ple, when the issue is whether usage should be admissible to
show acceptable customary ranges of quality, it may be that a
penalty-type approach to inducing parties to include more de-
tailed quality specifications in their agreements might work. If,
however, it is difficult to describe a quality standard that a non-
expert court will be able to apply, it might be better to encourage
transactors to include a quality-determining wiseman provision
in their contract. Whether the inclusion of wiseman provisions in
appropriate circumstances is more likely to be induced by a de-
fault rule that enforces every clause precisely as written, or one
that interprets written clauses by customary practices, is just one
of many open questions relating to the Code's incorporation strat-
egy that are in need of further exploration.
More generally, it is important to note that one of the pri-
mary justifications for looking to custom to fill gaps and interpret
contracts is that the customs themselves provide useful informa-
tion to generalist judges about the intent of the parties, or failing
that, about a range of practices whose widespread use suggests
that they are viewed as reasonable by industry transactors. How-
ever, recognizing that the customs often evolve to govern situa-
tions where transactors trust one another and want to continue
dealing, but that cases arise when the very trust that makes the
custom workable has broken down, suggests that there is no rea-
son to suppose that customs will provide useful information about
what contracting parties would have agreed to had they included
a provision stating how the matter at issue was to be dealt with if
third-party adjudication were required. In addition, because so
many customs have an implied precondition that the transactors
trust one another, and because many customs condition on this
and other information that is inexpensively observable, but that
may be quite expensive to verify (that is, to prove to a court with
reasonable accuracy), even customs that are widely followed may
Id (citations omitted).
'This suggests another reason that transactors routinely keep clearly unenforceable
boilerplate in their contracts. Under the Code, these terms may be unenforceable today
but they may also ripen into a custom if they are used by other firms with sufficient fre-
quency over a long enough period of time.
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be poor candidates for judicial enforcement. First, from an ex
ante perspective, transactors are unlikely to want to spend an in-
finite amount of money establishing their case if a dispute arises.
And second, third-party application of these types of customs may
well be error prone. Transactors may therefore prefer a third
party to apply a very different rule, one that may be less well-
tailored to their relationship, but easier and less costly to dispute
under should a problem arise.
In sum, while the fact that the Code is built on a highly ques-
tionable empirical basis does not necessarily mean that its draft-
ers erred, it does mean that it is necessary to inquire into
whether a justification for the incorporation strategy can be con-
structed that takes merchant reality as its starting point.247 This
inquiry is particularly timely, not only because the revised
Code-which extends the incorporation principle-will soon be
submitted to the States for their approval, but also because pro-
posals to create commercial law in transition economies often
take as their starting point the desirability of codifying existing
commercial practices.
'7Even if, in merchant industries that adopted trade rules, customs arose as ranges
around these focal point rules, this would still not justify the incorporation strategy. The
industries that have adopted such rules are, for the most part, precisely those that have
also chosen to opt out of the public legal system, making it much less common for their
disputes to wind up being governed by the Code in the first place.
